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Rural Poverty and Markets 
Markets play a basic role in economic welfare.  In rich countries life would be 
unimaginable without access to a wide array of reasonably well functioning markets, 
from food to credit and insurance.  It is almost never the case that a rich-country 
household has to produce something in order to consume it, or that its members cannot 
sell their labor for a salary or wage.  Credit markets function for small businesses and 
farms to finance investment projects, credit cards can be used to help households cover 
income shortfalls, and insurance markets help protect people from unexpected income 
and health shocks.   
Access to markets is just as compelling for a poor rural household in Rwanda, 
India or Peru.  Without good access to markets, a poor household cannot market its 
produce, obtain inputs, sell labor, obtain credit, learn about or adopt new technologies, 
insure against risks, or obtain consumption goods at low prices.  Equally important, it 
cannot use its scarce resources like land and labor efficiently.  Its decision making is 
constrained.  Cut off from markets, it is forced into self-sufficiency, whether for food, 
labor, or other items.  Its own subjective valuations, rather than market prices, then 
determine how its resources are used.   
Consider, for example, a poor farmer who can produce high-quality berries at a 
low price.  In town, exporters are willing to pay 20 cents a basket for berries like the ones 
he can grow; however, poor roads and information about buyers make marketing this 
perishable crop too expensive and risky.  So the farmer produces a few baskets for his 
family’s own consumption, and he spends the rest of his time doing low-wage work, 
when available, on a nearby ranch.  A basket of berries costs him 10 cents to produce.  
Implicitly, then, this is his decision price, or the price at which he is willing to produce 
berries.   If he could become part of the export supply chain, his decision price would 
increase to the market price.  He could be more efficient, shifting some of all of his time 
from low wage work to berry production, and he would have an incentive to invest in his 
farm.  Most importantly, he could generate badly needed cash for his family.   
When a household’s production and consumption decisions are based on 
subjective valuations instead of market prices, the household can reap gains, perhaps 
significant ones, by acquiring better access to markets.  For example, without access to a 
labor market, a poor family’s time may be “trapped” in low-return activities on the farm 
instead of being sold for a wage in higher-return activities on another farm or at a 
business in a nearby town.  When high transportation costs or marketing risk keep a 
farmer from selling a cash crop, her fallback is to produce a lower-value crop that can be 
eaten at home.  When a farmer cannot obtain fertilizer or hire labor at the times needed, 
or when he lacks the cash to pay for these inputs, less land is sown, output falls and more 
productive technologies may not be adopted.  Efficiency is critical, because even a small 
income gain can make a significant difference for an impoverished household. 
Lack of market access can have catastrophic effects on rural households when 
disasters strike.  Serious crop failures (more than 25% below-average harvests) occur in 
Southern Africa in about once every five years.  When these happen, local food prices 
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rise disproportionately (that is, above the import parity price), with seriously negative 
effects on rural households.  On the other hand, when local markets are closely integrated 
with global markets, a poor harvest will have little if any effect on local food prices.  
Without the ability to sell, irregular bumper harvests depress grain prices, undermining 
the incomes of small farmers who manage to produce a surplus.  The result is cycles of 
low-price glut followed by scarcity (Poulton, et al., 2005). 
Markets are important for pro-poor development and poverty alleviation, for 
many reasons.1  The livelihoods of most of the world’s poor people depend directly on 
their involvement in markets, either as producers or workers.  Historically, the major 
successes in poverty reduction have been associated with the growth of markets and the 
private economy.  When asked about the major challenges confronting them, poor people 
frequently cite markets—either their lack of access to markets or the effects of markets 
on their livelihoods.  Markets can play a valuable role in promoting and facilitating 
economic efficiency, by facilitating exchange and the coordination of many different 
kinds of resources, goods and services.  They can help protect poor people from local 
food-production shocks.  In these ways, markets are vital for income growth and survival.   
Nevertheless, markets frequently fail to serve the interests of the poor.  
Understanding why is critical for designing rural poverty-eradication policies.  
The market challenges confronting the poor are probably greater now than ever 
before, because the context is changing rapidly.  Governments are withdrawing from their 
traditional involvement in agricultural markets, increasingly obligated to do so by the 
international trade agreements into which they voluntarily enter.  Globalization exposes 
agricultural producers to international price gyrations but brings potential benefits as well 
as threats.   
At the same time, in most countries agricultural markets are being transformed by 
the new demands of exporters and supermarkets.  There is wide evidence that poor rural 
producers have found themselves systematically precluded from these high-value market 
chains, left to fend for themselves in traditional markets in which prices, as well as 
quality and other demands, are lower. 
The changing market reality offers opportunities for those poised to take 
advantage of them as agricultural producers or, increasingly, as nonagricultural producers 
and wage earners.  The overarching challenge for small farmers is to find ways to engage 
in agricultural markets on more favorable terms, specifically: 
• Moving into new high-value agricultural market chains.  This includes 
both access to new markets and capacity to enter them. 
• For the majority of farmers, who are not part of high-value chains, 
making use of existing agricultural markets.  This includes both access 
to agricultural input and output markets and the capacity to use them. 
                                                 
1
 For an excellent discussion see Dorward, et al., 2003. 
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• For all farmers, adjusting and taking advantage of the rapidly 
changing agricultural market environment.  This includes both 
opportunities and threats created by globalization, liberalization, and the 
transformation of agricultural market chains. 
These challenges and the ways are needed to address them take different forms 
for different poor rural households, because the rural poor are heterogeneous, they 
frequently receive income from multiple agricultural and nonagricultural sources, and 
they depend on different markets for their livelihoods. 
      
I 
Setting the Stage:  Rural Poverty and the Role of Markets 
The role of markets is complex, for many reasons.  There are many different kinds 
of markets, and a particular market may be important to some poor households but not to 
others.  Often rural households are both producers and consumers of crops.  Market 
competition brings greater efficiency and lower prices for consumers, who include the 
poor; however, it also is a threat for some producers.  Poor rural households are diverse; 
thus, different markets matter for different poor people.  In general, access to not one but 
multiple markets is needed in order for poor households to find a pathway out of poverty, 
and many of the ways in which markets affect rural poverty are indirect.  Putting markets 
to work for the rural poor requires having not only access to markets but also the 
complementary assets required to make effective use of these markets.   
 
Which Markets Matter to Poor Households? 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the roles of diverse markets in shaping the livelihoods of 
rural households.  The vertical panels in the figure depict the two stages leading to 
income and livelihood outcomes in an economic model of an agricultural household:  I) 
Production, activity choice, and income; and II) the transformation of income into 
livelihood outcomes via consumption.  They reflect the dual nature of agricultural 
households, as both producers and consumers.  The progression from one stage to the 
next is not linear; the double arrows spanning the panels indicate that there are important 
feedbacks.  For example, in the imperfect-market environments characterizing most poor 
rural areas, incomes and consumption shape production (as when a poor household 
cannot afford crop inputs or must sacrifice leisure instead of hiring labor), and so may 
livelihood outcomes (as when hunger impedes one’s ability to work).   
In Stage I, rural households engage in multiple activities (colored blue in the 
Figure), as discussed in the Background Paper for Chapter 1.  They include subsistence 
production, commercial agricultural and livestock production, nonagricultural production, 
migration, and wage labor.  The household’s production decisions generate outcomes 
(green), which include “portfolios” of production and incomes.  Even in a single 
 4 
household, the production portfolio often contains a diversity of agricultural and 
nonagricultural products.   
With the exception of subsistence production, the household’s activities create 
flows of goods and incomes (depicted by the solid arrows).   Output markets turn 
commercial production into income.  The resulting household income portfolios, like the 
activities that produce them, often are diverse.  In Stage II, household income portfolios 
and subsistence production produce demand and livelihood outcomes, including 
consumption of home-produced and/or purchased food.   
Multiple markets (colored blue) affect the household at each stage of this 
livelihood creation process.  The influences of markets are depicted by broken arrows in 
the Figure.  In Stage I, access to markets for inputs, technology, and extension shapes 
subsistence and commercial production.  So does access to factor markets, including 
land, labor, and capital.  If these markets are not accessible, or if they are accessible only 
on terms that are unfavorable to the household, both the mix of activities and the 
efficiency with which activities are carried out will be affected.  For example, without 
access to vital agricultural inputs, the family may forego high-paying commercial 
production and instead use its labor for low-value subsistence production, low-paying 
wage work, or migration.   
The ability to sell on equitable terms in output markets is crucial in transforming 
production into cash.  For many poor rural families, so is the ability to obtain secure and 
high-paying jobs in agricultural and nonagricultural labor markets, as well as to convert 
migrant earnings into remittances at low cost.  In Stage II, the ability to transform cash 
into consumption depends on having secure and efficient access to consumption markets.   
Access to financial markets is vital at all stages of the household’s livelihood 
chain.  The lack of credit and income security deprives households of access to 
productive inputs and discourages them from producing high-value but risky crops; high 
transfer costs can deprive households of 20% or more of the monies their migrants remit; 
and when the household lacks access to financial services, sharp swings in cash income 
can translate into equally sharp swings in consumption, from which it may be difficult to 
recover.  The role of financial markets is discussed in the Background Paper for Chapter 
3 of this Report. 
The broken lines in the figure represent the final links in the market chains 
connecting rural households to the sellers of the inputs and consumption goods they 
demand and the buyers of the goods and services they supply.  When accessible, the 
output market gives the farmer a farmgate price, which if high enough will give the 
farmer an incentive to produce for the market; otherwise not.  Conditions all along the 
market chain end up shaping this farmgate price.  For example, if a farmer is part of a 
high value market chain, with a contract to supply a luxury hotel with quality fruit on a 
regular basis, this will be reflected in a high farmgate price.  If instead she sells her 
harvest in the local spot market or to a trader when other farmers are trying to sell 
identical produce, her farmgate price almost certainly will be low, even if the trader is 
able to secure a much higher price in the urban or export market where he sells.  Poor 
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farmers’ information about the prices paid for their produce further along the market 
chain is likely to be scarce or nonexistent.  This limits their ability to bargain for a better 
price.  A trader who owns the only truck in a village can exert monopolistic control over 
the market, buying low from farmers and selling high in town.  Powerful supermarket 
chains and their agents increasingly are becoming powerful players in the market chain, 
dictating terms and influencing prices for intermediaries and farmers.   
 
Formal and Informal Markets 
The spectrum of market relations is bracketed by two extremes.  At one are the 
many poor subsistence producer households do not sell any of their production and 
supply many of their own inputs.  At the other extreme are large commercial households 
that sell all or most of what they produce and purchase most of their inputs.  In between 
are many households, often poor, selling small amounts of their crops as the need for 
cash arises and supplying some of their own inputs while purchasing others.  Often they 
are involved in informal markets, for example, transacting a few kilos of grain to a 
neighbor or the local store, striking labor exchanges to harvest their crops, sharecropping, 
or engaging in informal loans—frequently with interlocking markets, e.g., a loan from a 
landlord in connection with sharecropping and a promise to supply labor on the 
landlord’s estate at harvest time.   Informal market relations also can characterize small 
commercial farmers, as when a trader advances cash to purchase inputs ahead of the 
harvest and then subtracts it (along with interest) from his purchase price.  For many of 
the world’s rural poor, having access to these informal markets is critical to survival, 
particularly when access and the capacity to use formal markets are limited. 
 
Diversity among Poor Rural Households 
Poor rural households exist in a diversity of market settings.  The Background 
Paper for Chapter 1 illustrates the diversity of activities in which poor rural households 
participate and from which they get income.  Most striking perhaps is poor households’ 
reliance on wage labor markets.  In some cases, most of a poor household’s wage income 
comes from agricultural work; examples include the largely agriculture-based economies 
of Africa (World Bank, 2008).  In others, nonagricultural wages are more important than 
agricultural wages.  In China and most Latin American countries, non-agricultural wages 
play a far greater role in rural household incomes than do agricultural wages.  
Nevertheless, crop production is an important income activity for rural 
households, particularly in agriculture-based economies.  In Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi 
and Nigeria, even the poorest households participate in output markets, selling part of 
their crops. The poor African households in the RIGA data set marketed an average of 
between 26% and 59% of their output.  
As we saw in the Background Paper for Chapter 1, rural households are 
diversified across income activities.   Many have diversified agricultural activities, as 
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well.  This finding by Ellis, et al. (2003) is typical:  “Poor rural Malawians confront 
multiple severe constraints that can only be addressed by some combination of raising 
agricultural productivity, diversifying farm output to reduce risk and shift toward higher 
value outputs, and diversifying livelihoods toward nonfarm enterprises.”  Access to 
agricultural input and output markets is vital for poor rural households that receive a 
significant part of their income from agricultural activities, as owner-operators, 
renters/sharecroppers or agricultural laborers. 
Data from living standards measurement surveys (LSMS) reveal sharp disparities 
in market access between poor and non-poor rural households.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 for the 15 countries of the RIGA data set.  The figure was constructed from an 
infrastructure access index that included both public goods (electricity, telephone, etc.) 
and distance to schools, health centers and towns, using principle components analysis.  
Infrastructure access was measured differently in the 15 surveys; thus, the indices are not 
directly comparable across countries.  Nevertheless, in all 15 countries the difference in 
infrastructure access between poor and non-poor households is striking.  The index is 
always positive for non-poor rural households and negative for the poor.   
Differences in market involvement between poor and non-poor rural households 
are also evident in specific input and output markets.  Poor households’ participation in 
input markets tends to be more limited than that of non-poor households.  In Nicaragua, 
19% of poor households involved in agriculture purchased fertilizers, compared with 
32% of non-poor households.  In Panama the shares were 11% and 38%, respectively; in 
Bulgaria, 17% ad 54%; and in Pakistan, 55% and 70%.  In Malawi, Ghana and 
Madagascar, half or fewer of rural households in the lowest land quintile purchased 
fertilizer, and 12.9% or fewer purchased pesticides.  Many more used hired labor:  64% 
in Ghana, 33% in Madagascar, and 29% in Malawi.  In China, very few agricultural 
households hire labor.  These differences in participation in markets between the poor 
and non-poor become magnified when one looks at the amounts of inputs purchased, 
which tend to be much larger for the non-poor. 
Country-wide indices on rural access to markets certainly mask large regional 
differences.  The households that have access to markets tend to be concentrated in a few 
regions within countries.  In the other regions, access indices would show far lower levels 
of market participation. 
 
Diversity within Rural Households 
Not only do different markets matter for different households; the role played by 
markets is not the same for all activities or for all members within households. 
In most countries, a few large commercial producers coexist with many small 
commercial, subsistence and infra-subsistence farmers.  Large farms can be thought of as 
pure production enterprises, but small-farm households have a dual character:  they are 
both producers and consumers of food.  That rural households engage in both production 
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and consumption activities has been recognized for a long time.  When food prices go up, 
these households “win” as producers but “lose” as consumers.  If a poor farmer does not 
produce enough food for his family’s subsistence and must turn to the market to fill the 
gap, he loses when food prices go up.   
In remote areas where physical access to markets is costly, households diversify 
their production partly to satisfy their own consumption demands (Omamo, 1998).  High 
costs of buying and selling in food markets force many households into subsistence 
production:  selling becomes unprofitable, and it is cheaper to produce one’s own food 
than to buy it in the marketplace.  It is rational for smallholders not to adopt innovations 
that raise productivity if they raise transaction costs by more.  Because they produce only 
for home consumption, subsistence producers are not directly affected by changes in the 
market price of food.  However, poor subsistence farmers often purchase inputs, and thus 
they are adversely affected when the prices of these inputs rise.   
Subsistence farmers also may be affected indirectly by changes in the market 
price of food, through their market relationships with commercial food producers.  For 
example, a decrease in the market price of grain induces profit-driven commercial 
farmers to scale back their production.  If a subsistence household sells some of its labor 
to the commercial farm to get cash, its income will fall.  The subsistence farm does not 
sell grain, but it loses when the grain price falls, because of its links to the commercial 
farm via the labor market.  Paradoxically, its subsistence production of grain may 
increase as a result of the decrease in market price.  Unable to work for a wage, it may 
spend more time producing the subsistence crop at home.  Grain production on the 
subsistence farm increases, but welfare goes down.  In this “immiserized growth” 
scenario, poor households retreat more deeply into subsistence production (Dyer, et al., 
2006).  
In many poor rural areas, smallholders are net buyers of staples.  As consumers, 
they benefit if access to new markets lowers their consumption costs (Jayne).  A given 
amount of cash will go a longer way towards alleviating poverty if the prices that poor 
households pay for their consumption goods are low.  High transaction costs and market 
power are notorious for raising consumption prices in rural areas, particularly for the 
poor.   
Heterogeneous interests and power asymmetries within poor households may lead 
to conflicting interests with regard to market changes.  Here, gender plays a particularly 
important role.  In Africa, there is convincing evidence that, within the same household, 
plots of land farmed by women do not receive the same amount of inputs as those farmed 
by men (Udry, 1996).  The household’s income could be increased by reallocating some 
inputs from male to female plots, but gender dynamics within the household prevent this 
from happening.  One implication is that an increase in market prices of “female” crops 
will not have the same effect on household income and welfare as an increase in the 
prices of “male” crops.  On the consumption side, there is evidence that income 
controlled by females is spent differently than income controlled by men.  Better access 
to markets for consumption goods favored by women (including food, according to most 
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studies) thus will have a different and perhaps more beneficial effect on household 
welfare than access to markets for goods favored by men. 
In short, poor rural households are diverse in many ways that shape the effects 
that markets have on their welfare.  Different markets represent obstacles for different 
households.  Moreover, the markets, themselves, are changing.  
 
The Changing Agricultural Policy and Market Environment 
Prior to the 1990s, governments often were heavily involved in agricultural input 
and output markets, subsidizing inputs and controlling output prices.  Input price 
subsidies benefited farmers with access to the subsidized inputs.  Cheap food policies in 
many countries kept local food prices artificially low relative to world prices, hurting 
farmers who were net sellers and depressing agricultural production and incomes while 
benefiting consumers, both rural and urban.  This was the case in many African and 
Asian countries.   
 In other countries, including Mexico and the Central American nations, 
protective import policies kept local food prices artificially high, benefiting net sellers but 
hurting consumers.  These policies favored some producers and consumers.  However, 
they depressed overall agricultural incomes, by encouraging farmers to invest in the 
protected crops and not in other crops that might be produced more efficiently.  
Overvalued exchange rates discouraged agricultural exports.  Many governments tried 
subsidized credit and insurance programs, usually with poor results.  They usually fell 
victim to the same conditions that caused the lack of private credit and insurance for poor 
farmers to begin with and carried a high cost for both the rural and national economies. 
As Jayne (2008) notes, “the cost of supporting smallholder production – through input 
subsidies, credit programmes with low repayment rates, commodity pricing policies that 
subsidized transport costs for smallholders in remote areas and the export of surpluses at 
a loss – contributed to fiscal crises and in some cases, macroeconomic instability.” 
The past decade has witnessed a transformation of the economic and political 
landscape in which poor rural households find themselves.  The state has redefined its 
role in the rural economy, from that of actively managing agricultural input and output 
markets to a more laissez-faire stance.  Globalization and integration, marked by the 
WTO and regional trade agreements, have simultaneously increased agricultural 
producers’ access to foreign markets while exposing them to greater competition from 
abroad.  The degree to which world prices are transmitted to local prices varies from 
place to place, but there is no doubt that the trend is for farmers to be increasingly 
exposed to swings in global prices for the crops they produce and the food they consume.   
Poor farmers are particularly vulnerable to market price swings.  They face a 
dilemma.  Without access to markets, their income possibilities are restricted and they are 
exposed to catastrophic consumption price spikes when crops fail.  With market 
integration, they are exposed to constant gyrations in world prices, instead.   
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Fluctuations in agricultural prices on world markets have been particularly 
striking in recent years.  So have the inter-connections between food and energy markets, 
as a growing amount of the world’s agricultural production goes to biofuels.  Figure 4.3 
illustrates the recent trends in the world prices of the major food crops.  Each of these 
price trends is volatile, and all move sharply higher after 2000.  An increasing amount of 
corn production is being demanded for biofuels (Figure 4.4).  Not surprisingly, as oil 
prices increase, so do corn prices (Figure 4.5).  The effects of higher prices for crops used 
in energy production spill over into higher prices for other food crops, which compete 
with biofuel crops for land and other resources.   
How these rising international food prices affect prices within countries depends 
on exchange rates and policies.  Exchange rates convert international prices (in US 
dollars) into local currency.   Recently, the US dollar has weakened against most nations’ 
currencies.  This has blunted a large proportion of international cereal price increases.  If 
the world price of rice increases 10%, but a country’s currency strengthens against the 
dollar by 10%, the domestic price is unaffected by the higher world price.  In the 
Philippines, the world price of rice in pesos rose 10% between the fourth quarter of 2003 
and 2007, even though the world price in dollars rose 56%.   In the future, if domestic 
currencies fall relative to the dollar, the effect of higher world prices on domestic prices 
will become magnified instead. 
Countries’ macroeconomic performance thus can affect local food prices via the 
exchange rate.  Governments can also use price stabilization policies to reduce the impact 
of rising world prices (see Part III).  The combined effects of the exchange rate and 
stabilization policies resulted in domestic prices of rice being substantially below world 
prices in the Asian countries depicted in Figure 4.6.  Domestic prices of rice rose only 3% 
in Philippines and Viet Nam and 5% in India.  The world dollar price of maize rose 40% 
between the fourth quarter of 2003 and 2007, but in Philippine pesos it fell by 1%, and 
the domestic price of maize in the Philippines rose by only 5%. 
The competition between biofuels and food no doubt will intensify in the future, 
and there are indications that the observed long term decline in real prices could come to 
a halt, signaling a structural change in world agricultural commodity markets.  
What does this mean for the rural poor? 
This question really has two parts.  The first is whether the recent increases in 
world food prices make their way to the places where the rural poor live.  Once exchange 
rates and government price stabilization policies translate world prices into domestic 
prices, the effect on the farmgate prices received by farmers and on the consumer prices 
paid by households depends on how efficiently markets transmit price changes across 
space within countries.    The second part of the question is whether increases in local 
food prices are good or bad for poor rural households.  The answer to both of these 
questions is “It depends.” 
A few studies have tried to test for market integration, that is, whether local food 
prices vary in tandem with world prices.  They find that that the extent to which changes 
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in world prices are transmitted within countries varies from place to place, reflecting 
differences in country policies as well as the efficiency of domestic markets.  The 
transaction costs of using markets may be different from one village to another and also 
among farmers in the same village, for example, where one farmer has a truck and others 
do not.  Because of this and other structural features of markets (including monopolies), 
healthy systems of market exchange do not appear overnight after market reforms.  
“Markets require supporting infrastructure, institutions and policies, and are mediated 
through existing social and economic relationships (Park, et al., 2002).”  In some 
instances this means that benefits and costs of market reforms do not reach small farmers 
as quickly as they might if markets operated more efficiently.  Generally, the benefits and 
costs of market reforms will reach some farmers more quickly than others. 
Mexico is a case in point.  The 2003 Mexico National Rural Household Survey 
found that the average price of a kilogram of maize in village stores was 2.57 pesos.  
However, it ranged from 0.8 to 11 pesos.  For every 10 kilometers of distance from the 
village to the local (county) commercial center, the maize price increased by an average 
of around 4 cents.  The distances to the commercial center ranged from 1.5 to 300 
kilometers.  The survey also found striking differences in wages:  the daily wage of an 
agricultural worker ranged from 40 to 140 pesos. 
Some countries have tried to minimize regional price differences through pan-
territorial pricing.  These are policies that give farmers a higher price for their crop in 
low-price areas—or, more commonly, try to impose a lower price in high-price areas (in 
an effort to keep food prices low for consumers).  The effect on the rural poor depends on 
whether the poor are net producers or net consumers of the crop.  Inevitably, pan-
territorial pricing creates distortions that discriminate against some crops and results in 
potentially costly losses in agricultural efficiency, a drag on agricultural growth.   
The dual character of poor rural households as producers and consumers creates 
an inherent conflict of interests within the household.  What is good for production (e.g., 
a higher food price) may be bad for consumption (higher food costs).  Some recent 
studies of the effects of changing food-import prices on rural households suggest that the 
consumption effects dominate the welfare outcome for most small-farm households in 
Central America (Taylor, et al., 2007).  Meanwhile, research from Mexico suggests that 
the supply of cereal crops is not as elastic as often thought (Dyer, 2007), and for the 
nation’s many small, subsistence farmers, it may be perverse, increasing when the market 
price falls (Dyer, et al., 2006). 
Supply Chains and the Supermarket Revolution 
At the same time that farmers have become increasingly integrated with regional 
and world markets, there has been a rapid and profound transformation of agricultural 
supply chains in many countries, driven by exporters and supermarkets.  As the demand 
for vegetables, fruit, nuts and other high valued products has risen, urban retailers are 
handling increasingly more of these high value commodities.  The demands of 
international consumers as well as large-scale retailers are reshaping the supply chain.  
Studies find that, in much of South America and East Asia, the average share of 
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supermarkets in food retail went from roughly only 10-20% circa 1990 to 50-60% by the 
early 2000s (Reardon and Berdegué 2002, Reardon et al. 2003). These countries saw 
supermarket diffusion in a single decade that took some five decades in the U.S. and the 
U.K. 
Can a small producer whose vegetables fetch a low price in a local produce 
market become a supplier of Wal-Mart or Carrefour?  Or will she be driven out by larger, 
more efficient suppliers?  As more and more consumers buy their vegetables at 
supermarkets, can small farmers afford to remain in traditional market chains?  Or will 
the defection of middle and large producers to new, high-value chains open up new 
spaces for poor producers to compete in traditional markets?   
In the new agricultural market environment, the private sector and civil society 
are becoming increasingly integrated.  Rural households, governments, development 
institutions, and NGOs are all scrambling to find their way in this new order.  As a recent 
report put it,  
“This has created many new opportunities, but also new questions 
regarding the roles, functions and core capacities of the various key 
players. Deep-rooted principles and paradigms have been cut down in a 
short period. It is sometimes like mixing an Italian basketball team with 
Nigerian soccer players, and trying to play in a volleyball tournament. 
The new situation raises many questions about how the game is played, 
and who are the winners and losers (KITT, et al., 2006, xii).” 
It is important to realize that the impact of supermarkets on agriculture varies enormously 
from country to country.  Evidence suggests that supermarkets have had a negligible 
influence thus far in Africa (Jayne, 2008).  Tschirley et al (2004a) and Tschirley et al 
(2004b) found that in Africa supermarket chains held less than 2 per cent of the national 
urban fresh produce market in late 2003.  Traill (2006) estimates that Kenyan 
supermarkets will hold at most a 16 per cent share of total food sales by 2013.  One study 
found that, even in the relatively modernized capital of Kenya, Nairobi, small kiosks, 
informal shops, and small independent stores accounted for 71 per cent of consumers’ 
expenditures on food staples; local open markets and small millers account for another 13 
per cent, and the big supermarket chains accounted for only 17 per cent (Muyanga et al, 
2005).  Throughout the country, across all retail consumer food expenditures, the share of 
supermarkets is estimated to be roughly 3 per cent. Reardon and Timmer (2006) note that 
there is uncertainty about how quickly the supermarket sector will grow even in Kenya, 
and in most of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa it is “unlikely that…we will see 
supermarket growth for several decades.”  This means that, with the exception of the 
small minority of farmers who are able to enter high-value export and supermarket 
chains, traditional market chains will continue to be more important for small African 
farmers than modern ones.  The challenge, then, is how to enable poor African farmers to 
capture more benefits within traditional market chains. 
 
 12 
II 
Challenges for Poor Farmers in the New Market Reality 
Poor farmers are typically the weakest link in market chains on both the 
production and consumption side.  They are the least able to take advantage of new 
market opportunities and the most vulnerable to the rapidly changing market environment 
around them.  No matter how successful they are at improving their production practices 
and raising productivity on the farm, the terms with which they engage in markets 
represent a constraint, often a decisive one.   
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which agricultural markets can be used to 
help poor households meet the objectives of higher income and greater income stability.  
First, poor farmers can move from low to high value market chains.  Many of the most 
captivating development success stories in recent years involve small farmers 
significantly increasing the value of what they produce by moving into new market 
chains.  Second, they can increase their share of benefits in existing chains.  These two 
challenges become one and the same for the world’s many small farmers who are unable 
to access any markets. 
Poor farmers face significant obstacles both to entering high-value chains and to 
strengthening their position within existing ones, however.     
 
Challenges to Entering High-Value Chains and Capturing More Value in Existing 
Ones 
In general, small farmers have to create value in order to capture benefits in 
markets.  No downstream market actor would be willing to pay more for the same thing 
that they now get at a low price.  The key challenge, then, is enabling poor farmers to 
create and capture more value, whether in existing or new market chains.  As agriculture 
becomes increasingly integrated with agribusiness and retailing and procurement systems 
are increasingly connected to supermarkets, new opportunities arise, but the challenges 
become more daunting.  Competition in modern agricultural supply chains is intense, so 
strategy, innovation and efficiency are critical.  Only chain participants who are able to 
compete and add value can survive in modern supply chains.     
Poor farmers are at a disadvantage in this new agricultural market environment.  
Modern procurement systems favor large farmers in most countries.  Naturally, buyers 
for supermarkets and agro-industries prefer to buy a reliable supply of high-quality 
produce from a small number of large farmers instead of many small ones, if they can.  
Nevertheless, market empowerment is not only determined by farm size.  Many small 
farmers can participate gainfully in modern supply chains if (a) if they can ensure buyers 
of a reliable quantity and quality of output, and (b) if the production of many small farms 
can be efficiently aggregated into the larger lots demanded by buyers.  In order to 
succeed, small farmers need to have access to physical, human, and social assets: to 
education, irrigation, transport, roads, and such other physical assets as wells, cold 
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chains, greenhouses, good quality irrigation water (free of contaminants), vehicles, and 
packing sheds (World Bank, 2008, p. 127).   
Belonging to an effective producer organization can be a vital asset enabling 
small farmers to enter high-value supply chains.  Group action is valuable when it is able 
to reduce transaction costs, either on the input or output side.  On the input side, it can 
improve farmers’ access to seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs as well as credit and 
information at lower cost.  A study in Kenya found that lack of credit was the single 
major constraint limiting the success of producer marketing groups (Shiferaw, et al, 
2006).  On the output side, it can make it possible to combine many farmers’ production 
into larger lots.  Both increase value in the supply chain. A farmers’ organization also can 
increase farmers’ bargaining power with buyers. 
Nevertheless, a producers association is not likely to succeed if its members do 
not have access to the other assets just listed.  Most farmers in developing countries who 
lack these assets find themselves excluded from high-value market chains.  To a great 
extent, poverty is about not having access to assets (see Background Paper for Chapter 1).  
This, in a nutshell, is the greatest challenge to bringing poor agricultural producers into 
high-value supply chains.   
In fact, there is strong evidence that farmers’ access to land, water and other key 
resources is critical to group success (Barham, 2006).  As a result, poor farmers tend to 
be left out of initiatives to organize small farmers and improve their market access.  As 
Shepherd (2007) notes: 
“Collective access to markets for the poorest farmers who lack education, 
numeric skills, etc., is improbable and thus some form of targeting is 
required to ensure that farmers have the minimum qualities for successful 
intervention.  Linking organizations...want to work with poor farmers who 
have the potential to supply markets.  But poor farmers usually lack crops 
with market potential and have poor market access because of road 
conditions and other constraints.”    
In China, it appears that the poor are able to participate in the new opportunities 
arising from the growing demand for high value horticulture commodities.  Smallholders’ 
access to very good markets is a key to China’s success in this regard.  Another key may 
be that modern wholesalers and retailers have not penetrated into rural communities—the 
supply of horticultural products in China largely flows through traditional small-trader 
dominated supply chains (Wang, et al., in press).  Because of the nature of land 
institutions in China, buyers, whether in modern or traditional market chains, generally 
do not have the option of purchasing from large farmers like in most other countries. 
China may be an exception, though.  There are many examples of projects that 
have successfully brought small farmers into high-value market chains.  (Some of these 
are described in Part III).  However, the poorest farmers are not likely to be the 
beneficiaries of these projects.  When bringing the poorest farmers into new supply 
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chains entails overcoming severe marketing and asset obstacles, it is worth considering 
whether other, more accessible pathways out of poverty should be pursued, instead.  
Frequently, success stories involving small farmers in high-value chains focus on 
export markets.  However, overall, developing countries export less than 10% of their 
fruit and 5% of their vegetable production.  This naturally makes domestic markets a 
more reasonable target for market-chain development.  Domestic markets offer other 
advantages.  In export markets, increasingly farmers have to meet not only quality 
standards but also safety requirements, and in the future they will have to comply with a 
range of other social, environmental and ethical criteria.  Export producers are confronted 
by an on-going need to stay up-to-date with new standards or else risk losing their 
position in the market.   
Chile following its fruit-export boom is an excellent illustration of how this 
affects the competitiveness of small farmers.  Approximately 43% of Chile’s agricultural 
land (9.9 millions of hectares) was expropriated between 1965 and 1973; nearly all large 
farms were partly or wholly redistributed as parcels averaging 9 Basic Irrigated Hectares 
(BIH).2  Today, the average size of fruit-export farms is approaching 50 hectares.  A 
small farmer wishing to partake in export markets faces stiff challenges in this new 
market environment, and a poor small farmer even more so. 
Not surprisingly, market linkage projects currently reach only a small minority of 
farmers.  NGOs and governments almost never include a rigorous diagnostic component 
in their projects to test whether poverty would be higher without the projects, but because 
of the considerations described above, few poor farmers have benefited directly from 
market linkage projects.   
A study of potato and coffee producers in Peru found evidence that technical 
service providers screen farmers for primary schooling before offering them assistance 
with access to “dynamic markets.”   The key characteristics determining market access 
were found to include human capital (primary education, household size, gender of 
household head), agricultural and livestock asset holdings, social capital (number of 
organizations to which the farmer belongs), and risk aversion and access to credit.  The 
latter is particularly important given that transportation costs are higher for farmers 
supplying dynamic markets than for those in traditional markets, due to greater distance 
to dynamic markets as well as quality requirements that raise transportation costs.  
Nevertheless, the study found that the lack of access to dynamic markets can be 
overcome for a large segment of small farmers, by designing interventions focusing on 
their disadvantages relative to farmers who supply those markets.  “Although it obviously 
is not the only solution for overcoming the problems of rural poverty, improving the 
opportunities for the small producer to gain access to new and better market opportunities 
is a critical objective of any rural development strategy (Escobal, 2005, p. 3).” 
                                                 
2
 A BIH was the amount of land estimated to have the equivalent productive potential of 1 ha of prime 
irrigated land in the Maipo River valley, one of Chile’s best agricultural regions. 
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If poor farmers are not able to enter high-value supply chains, they may still be 
able to benefit in other ways, particularly by supplying labor to commercial farms, via the 
demand linkages that are created within rural economies when agricultural incomes 
increase, or by entering or expanding their sales in traditional markets.  As the nonfarm 
economy expands, both in rural and urban areas, improved access to non-farm labor 
markets increasingly becomes an option for many poor rural households.  Nonfarm 
wages constitute the single largest source of income for rural households in a growing 
number of developing countries. 
 
Challenges to Capturing Benefits in Existing Chains 
Because most agricultural production goes into domestic markets and given the 
stringent quality and other demands farmers face in export markets, capturing benefits in 
existing supply chains offers greater promise to more agricultural households than trying 
to enter new, high-value chains.  Nevertheless, numerous studies by governments, 
development agencies and researchers reaffirm that serious market-access challenges 
confront poor rural households in traditional as well as modern markets.   
One study estimates the fixed transactions costs facing Kenyan semi-subsistence 
maize farmers in 30 villages to be 15.5% of market price and argues that these are a 
major barrier to market participation.  A study in Peru found that transaction costs 
represented 50% of the value of sales.  They were considerably higher for small 
producers (67%) than large producers (32%).  The components of these transaction costs 
included distance and time to market, the producers’ experience in the market, the 
stability of their relationships with buyers, and their investment of resources in 
supervising the implicit contracts related to their market transactions (Escobal d’Angelo, 
2000).  
A study in Tanzania found that when a price shock hits one market, its effects are 
transmitted imperfectly to other markets, the result of poor market integration and high 
transaction costs.  The time required for price differences to adjust half way ranged from 
just under 4 weeks (between Mbeya and Iringa) to more than 22 weeks (between Dar es 
Salaam and Iringa).  Adjustment “half lives” and transaction costs both increased with 
distance between markets (Van Campenhout, 2007). 
There are little-studied connections between formal and informal markets—and 
even with subsistence producers.  In Mexico, only 26.5% of farmers who grew either 
maize or beans sold their crops.  Two thirds of poor agricultural households in Mexico 
grow maize, but most are subsistence producers:  Only 17% sell any of their production. 
It appears that even subsistence producers are influenced by the market prices for these 
crops.  Although subsistence producers do not participate (or participate only minimally) 
in maize markets, it takes only one commercial producer to transmit the effects of 
changes in the market price of maize to subsistence producers in a village.  Price shocks 
in markets for staple goods are transmitted to subsistence producers through interactions 
in factor markets.  In a poor region of Mexico, a decrease in the market price of maize 
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was found to reduce commercial production sharply (unless accompanied by other 
policies to encourage maize production, like input price supports).  Yet subsistence 
production of maize went up, stimulated by lower wages and land rents.  The result was a 
situation of immiserized growth:  subsistence producers’ output increased, but their 
incomes fell.  A 10% drop in the market price of maize was found to increase poverty 
among subsistence farmers by as much as 1.7% (Dyer, et al., 2006).   
 
Responding to, and Benefiting from, Rapidly Changing Market Environments 
The alternative to moving forward, through empowerment in existing chains or 
entry into new ones, is not to stand still.  The market environment in which rural 
households find themselves is changing rapidly, and this raises new challenges.  A 
livelihood today, secured in part by protective import tariffs that keep food prices high, 
can quickly become untenable if those policies are dismantled and food prices fall to 
world prices.  On the other hand, a policy that opens up foreign markets for agricultural 
exports, or the arrival of the supermarket revolution, can create new income 
opportunities.  How can a rural household avoid falling into poverty in the first case and 
escape from poverty and prosper in the second? 
Responding to rapidly changing market environments becomes a challenge when 
households face constraints in gaining access to new, ascending markets and in moving 
out of old, descending ones.  The challenges are greater still for poor households that 
were not successful participants in traditional markets to begin with.  Economic research 
that tries to model the likely impacts of trade and market reforms on rural households 
assumes that households will shift their production and labor out of the activities that are 
disfavored by the reforms and into the activities that become relatively more profitable.3   
In real life, significant obstacles restrict poor households’ ability to adjust in this 
way.  One set of obstacles has to do with poor households’ lack of the assets, including 
land, capital, and skills, that are needed to enter new production and employment 
activities.  Another has to do with a lack of access to markets because of high transaction 
costs, typically in both input and output markets. 
When the obstacles prevent poor households from responding to market shocks, 
the fallback or default course of action is to continue on in what has become a more 
precarious activity, possibly falling into poverty or, if already poor, into poverty more 
deeply.   
Access to markets brings both income opportunities and threats to poor producers 
and workers.  Access to markets for agricultural goods can create direct benefits for poor 
self-employed producers of these goods, but only if they do not face serious barriers to 
entry associated with the nature of the crop, quality and quantity requirements, output 
marketing systems, input markets, and access to land and other assets.  There is 
                                                 
3
 This includes computable general equilibrium models.  Very few such models consider high transaction 
costs or other barriers limiting producers’ adjustment to market shocks. 
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considerable potential for poor households to benefit less directly, by supplying wage 
labor to less-poor farmers producing agricultural goods for new markets.  One of the 
most striking examples is Chile’s fruit boom, in which the rural labor market played a 
vital role in transmitting benefits of export production to poor rural households.    There 
is potential for poor households to benefit even less directly, by supplying goods and 
services demanded by less-poor farm households (see below).  
Recent studies explore the effects of market and trade integration.  In China, 
where both poor and non-poor farmers work small land holdings, agricultural labor 
markets are thin.  Because of this, there is little potential for poor rural households to 
benefit from Chile-style employment linkages. A similar problem arises in Mexico, 
where agricultural labor markets exist but where farm employment is falling even as the 
value of crop production increases—a rise in productivity perhaps related to new 
investments stimulated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  In 
these cases, if the agricultural incomes of poor households are going to increase as a 
result of trade integration, it will have to be via the sale of own agricultural production.  
Full-time farmers are among the absolute poorest in China and live in relatively poor 
parts of the nation (Rozelle, 1996; World Bank, 2005). 
For China, WTO will lead to more imports and lower prices of edible oils, sugar, 
maize and cotton.  Farmers producing those crops will have to become more productive 
just to stay even.  However, there are other commodities in which China has considerable 
comparative advantage—for example, rice, meat, aquaculture, and horticultural products. 
Cheaper imports of inputs (for example, feed grains, like maize and soybeans) will help 
those who produce or can shift into these competitive goods become even more 
competitive.   
A study of the effects of the WTO in China concluded that, for the average farm 
household, the net impact will be positive. However, not all households and not all 
commodities will be treated equally. Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004) find that good 
markets in the face of trade liberalization have a mixed effect.  If the poor happen to be 
producing an "internationally competitive commodity" and there are good domestic 
markets, they benefit from trade reform.  The opposite is true if the poor are producing 
"internationally uncompetitive commodities."  Poorer households, especially those in the 
provinces in the western parts of China, will be hurt. The main reason is that the farmers 
in Western China are currently producing commodities that are receiving positive rates of 
protection, and their production prices will fall.   
How, then, does one minimize the negative effect on these households?  The key 
is either to provide direct assistance in the form of income transfers that few countries 
can afford, or more constructively, to eliminate the constraints that prevent poor 
households from becoming more efficient by shifting their production towards the 
commodities that will benefit from trade liberalization and by increasing their 
productivity (through more R&D, extension, investment, and access to inputs, including 
credit).   
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Instead of urging a halt to liberalization, donors and development practitioners 
need to find ways to target those who are being hurt the most with assistance programs, 
while eliminating the constraints that keep poor households from shifting into more 
competitive activities.  The studies from China highlight the importance of thinking 
regionally.  When poor rural households are regionally concentrated, targeting them with 
development projects can be easier than when the poor have to be identified and targeted 
within more heterogeneous populations.  Nevertheless, poor regions tend to be poor 
because they face challenging geographic, economic or other constraints that may be 
difficult to address. 
 
Overcoming Obstacles Preventing Poor Households from Accessing and Using 
Markets 
Addressing these major challenges requires overcoming a number of obstacles, 
which loom particularly large for the rural poor.  Overcoming these obstacles represents 
“sub-challenges” that need to be the focus of policies and development projects.  The 
obstacles include: 
(1) A lack of power in agricultural input and output markets 
(2) Poor access to complementary assets 
(3) Poor access to complementary markets 
(4) Weak market linkages 
(5) Food security and inability to diversify income sources 
(6) Market isolation 
(7) Poor access to market information 
(8) Poverty traps 
(9) High Consumption Prices 
We consider each of these sub-challenges in turn. 
 
(1) Empowering Small Farmers within Markets 
Strengthening the market position of small farmers often is the most important 
single thing that governments and development projects can do to make agriculture a 
pathway out of rural poverty.  Reforms can be made along the market chain to make it 
more competitive and efficient, but this will not automatically create benefits for the 
poor.  For example, a truckers’ association can be formed to provide farmers with more 
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transportation options, breaking the monopoly of a local transporter.  More trucks should 
mean greater competition and lower freight prices for farmers.  Similarly, regulations that 
reduce the market power of a monopsonistic buyer in a supply chain can increase prices 
for any or all agents in the supply chain between the farmer and the buyer.  Poor farmers 
need to become empowered within market chains in order to reap benefits from such 
changes.  Otherwise, the benefits almost certainly will accrue to other chain actors.   
 
(2) Gaining Access to Complementary Assets 
  Household assets shape activity participation (See Background Paper for 
Chapter 1).  They also shape market participation.  Rural households cannot be expected 
to benefit from a greater and more equitable access to markets if they do not have the 
multiple complementary assets needed to compete in those markets.  These include 
human capital (education and know-how), natural capital (ownership of good quality land 
or access to other households’ land via local land markets), physical capital (the 
ownership of assets such as livestock and machinery), public capital (access to public 
services and infrastructure such as good roads, schools, health clinics, and electricity), 
social capital (participation in organizations, associations and links to other individuals 
and households, both within and outside the community), financial capital (access to 
credit, insurance), and geographic capital (proximity to markets and favorable agro-
climatic conditions).  (See Jalan and Ravallion, 2002).   Having access to markets may 
yield a positive economic return for a household, but this return may be small or even 
nonexistent unless the household has access to critical assets.  For example, the ability to 
take advantage of commercial opportunities in an output market depends on also having 
access to skills, capital, high-quality land, and input markets.   
Boughton, et al. (2006) find that participation in crop markets increases sharply as 
one moves into the upper tail of the land distribution in Mozambique.  Other assets, 
including livestock, labor and equipment, are also positively correlated with crop market 
participation.  And investments in roads and market information, without addressing 
these asset differences, are not likely to result in broad-based increases in crop market 
participation.  They find a troubling relationship between gender and markets.  Female-
headed households, even if they have the same assets as male-headed households, are 
significantly at risk of exclusion from cash crop contract farming opportunities. 
 
(3) Gaining Access to Complementary Markets 
Many of the world’s rural poor are farmers, so it is natural to focus on agricultural 
input and output markets when one thinks about the role of markets in rural poverty and 
poverty alleviation.  This makes sense in countries or regions where poor rural 
households get most of their income and/or food from their own crop production.  In a 
number of African countries, studies show that agricultural growth reduces rural poverty 
and hunger.   There are also poor rural households in more urbanized and transition 
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countries that depend on farming for their livelihoods.  Facilitating access to agricultural 
input and output markets in these cases is almost certainly a prerequisite for escaping 
from poverty. 
Agricultural markets are not the only ones that matter, though.   
Incomplete markets (e.g. for land, labor, credit, or insurance) explain why many 
poor farmers reap meager and uncertain returns from their land.  Dorward et al. (2003) 
conclude that the poor are not likely to gain significantly as producers of tradable 
agricultural commodities as markets expand, unless they manage to get access to land, 
capital, and other key complementary markets and assets.   
Even for agricultural households, other markets matter.  Poor households lack the 
cash to invest in farm inputs.  If fertilizer would boost output and profits, this may be of 
little consequence to a poor farmer who cannot borrow.  An inherent challenge in 
agriculture is the need to purchase inputs months and, in some cases, years in advance of 
the harvest.   
Another inherent challenge is risk.  Nature supplies key inputs (rain, sunshine) 
free of charge but with uncertainty.  The inherent risks of farming make banks reluctant 
to loan to small farmers.  High transaction costs and information asymmetries between 
the bank and the farmer exacerbate this problem.  All of these problems, plus highly 
covariate risks (when one farmer’s crop fails, it is likely that many farmers’ will) make 
formal crop insurance nonexistent for all but a few of the world’s farmers and crops.   
The importance of financial markets for the rural poor is discussed in detail in the 
Background Paper for Chapter 3.  Typically, poor farmers face linked constraints in 
financial and agricultural input and output markets.  The most obvious linkage is poor 
farmers’ inability to pay for agricultural inputs when they do not have access to credit or 
savings, even if inputs are available and output can be marketed at competitive prices, the 
profits from selling a crop cannot be used to finance inputs prior to the harvest when 
credit is not available.  If banks are willing to loan money to small farmers, the terms of 
the loan may discourage risk-averse farmers from borrowing, particularly if they risk 
losing their property should they find themselves unable to repay the loan, for example, if 
severe weather destroys the crop.  Risk and credit constraints thus are inherently linked.  
A development project that enhances small farmers’ access to input and output markets 
as well as credit is still likely to fail if it does not address the inherent risks of going into 
debt to finance crop production.   
A similar problem involves consumption risk.  Food security concerns may divert 
poor people from their farms into low-paying wage work, creating a vicious circle of low 
productivity and food insecurity.  In Malawi, smallholders make up about 80% of the 
population and about 90% of the poor.  Recently, the government has made the growth of 
smallholder production a cornerstone of its development and poverty-alleviation strategy.  
Policy reforms focus on improving smallholders’ access to agricultural input and output 
markets, including the removal of restrictions on production and marketing of certain 
crops (particularly tobacco) and reforms in land and transport markets.  The hope is that 
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these reforms will increase smallholders’ access to new market opportunities and 
stimulate agricultural intensification and diversification as a means of reducing poverty. 
There is evidence that many smallholders leave their land to seek work as casual 
laborers at low wages.  The result is labor shortages on smallholder farms and low yields, 
as critical cropping activities are delayed or abandoned.  Will improved access to 
agricultural input and output markets reverse this trend?   
A recent study by Alwang and Siegel (1999) suggests not.  It concludes that a 
combination of liquidity constraints and concern for food security create labor shortages 
on smallholder farms.  Although wages are low, smallholders value the liquidity they 
provide as a means to achieve food security.  Low returns to labor and land on 
smallholder farms, in turn, exacerbate food insecurity, thus creating a vicious circle.  
Development projects focusing on agricultural input and output markets are not likely to 
succeed unless they address these linked constraints associated with financial market 
failures, including risk. 
According to Barrett, Reardon and Webb (2001 p. 321), “Missing credit markets 
can impede diversification into activities or assets characterized by substantial barriers to 
entry. Smallholders typically cannot afford to purchase a truck and enter the long-haul 
transport niche of the food marketing channel, no matter how profitable it might be 
(Barrett, 1997).” On the other hand, if non-farm or off-farm options can be accessed 
easily, but credit markets are thin or missing, non-farm earnings can be a means for 
overcoming working capital constraints and purchasing inputs for farming (e.g. fertilizer, 
seeds, equipment, labor) or to making capital improvements (e.g. bunds, ridges, 
irrigation) to one’s farm (Reardon et al., 1994; Pietola et al., 1998; Reardon et al., 1999). 
In some cases, nonagricultural markets can support agriculture.  Labor markets 
can substitute, albeit imperfectly, for a missing credit market.  So can migration:  Income 
sent home by family migrants can stimulate farm investments by providing cash and 
security (Rozelle, et al., 1999; Taylor, et al., 2003).  Wages from a son or daughter 
working off farm can help finance crop inputs and offer income security.  Long-distance 
migration links many small-farmer households with labor markets where wages are not 
correlated with crop incomes back home. Remittances from migrants can provide income 
security and make farmers more willing to make investments that yield high expected 
returns but are risky.  Of course, off-farm work and migration also can compete with 
agriculture for a poor household’s limited time. 
A new FAO study seeks to understand the ways in which off-farm income, 
primarily wages, influence crop production and activity choices in rural households.  It 
finds both bad news and good news for agricultural production.  When rural households 
have access to off-farm work, the opportunity cost of keeping their labor on the farm goes 
up, and this negatively affects crop production.  The good news is that income from off-
farm work improves smallholders’ ability to purchase inputs and raise productivity on the 
farm.  The challenge confronting development practitioners is not how to keep the labor 
on the farm; it is how to make off-farm income complement farm production and raise 
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incomes of the rural poor.  This invariably means helping poor households get better 
access to not only financial but also input and output markets on favorable terms.   
In other cases, credit may be available, but land is unacceptable as collateral 
(because laws make it difficult for banks to foreclose on the land) while evidence of 
steady off-farm cash income can enable one to borrow.  In still others, land may serve as 
collateral, but poor risk-averse households are unwilling to put themselves in danger of 
losing their land if their crops fail, or are willing to do so only if they also have access to 
nonfarm income (Boucher).  The result may be a diversification of poor households’ 
labor and other resources into multiple, low-return activities.  If, as is widely believed, 
risk aversion is decreasing in income and wealth, then the poor will exhibit greater 
demand for diversification for the purpose of ex-ante risk mitigation than the wealthy. 
The fact that diversification rises with wealth or income in both absolute and proportional 
terms in rural Africa (Reardon, 1997; Reardon et al., 1998; Barrett et al., 2000) 
underscores that the most vulnerable households lack the resources to diversify into 
nonagricultural markets. 
Agricultural markets are not the major source of income for many rural 
households, even in the poorest countries.  In a growing number of transition and 
urbanized countries, most rural income does not come from farming or farm wages (see 
Background Paper for Chapter 1).  Consider Nicaragua and Guatemala, where small basic 
grain producers get less than 5% of their income from growing basic grains.  The rest 
comes from a diversity of sources, including non-farm wages and migration.  Trying to 
raise income in these households by improving access to staple markets almost certainly 
would be the wrong approach.  In Easterly’s (2002) words, it would be like trying to 
make more pancakes by adding salt, not flour; that is, focusing on the wrong ingredient.   
The importance of non-agricultural markets in the income portfolios of poor rural 
households is highlighted by the study by Boughton, et al. (2006).  It concludes that, for 
Mozambique households that do not have the necessary asset portfolios to escape poverty 
through crop market participation, there will need to be policies and programs that enable 
more remunerative household participation in off-farm labor market and non-farm 
entrepreneurial opportunities. This conclusion is echoed by Dorward et al. (2003), who 
argue that poor rural households unable to benefit as producers when agricultural markets 
expand may be able to benefit in other ways.  Barriers to entry into nonfarm tradables 
production are likely to limit poor households’ ability to benefit from those activities as 
self-employed producers.  However, there is considerable potential for them to benefit 
indirectly, through employment on commercial farms and by providing nontradable 
goods and services to others who demand these things as their incomes rise.  Local 
markets, particularly for labor, need to work in order for poor rural households to reap 
these indirect benefits. 
Failures in agricultural input and output markets can prevent rural households 
from entering into nonagricultural activities where the returns to their labor may be 
higher.  Missing land markets, for example, can help explain why a skilled blacksmith 
who inherits land spends scarce time farming although his comparative advantage lies in 
smithwork. Were land markets operative, he might rent or sell his land and devote all his 
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time to blacksmithing. But in the absence of land markets, and with labor market 
imperfections that preclude hiring others, his optimal use of time may well include 
relatively low productivity farming, lest his land asset return nothing to him.  In China 
and (prior to recent changes in land tenure laws) Mexico, farmers had to work their lands 
or else risk having the government redistribute them to other households.  Reforms of 
land institutions that enable farmers to rent, buy and sell land can lead to higher incomes 
both on and off the farm. 
A poor household that does not produce a cash crop might begin doing so if it had 
access to the right input and output markets.  One has to understand poor households’ 
actual and potential income strategies, as well as the market challenges confronting them, 
in order to help them find a pathway out of poverty.  For a given poor rural household, 
the answer may be agriculture, but it also may lie in non-agricultural activities.  Either 
way, having access to efficient markets is fundamental. 
 
(4) Strengthening Market Linkages 
A market has direct importance to a poor rural household whose income depends 
on having access to the market.  Without access to input and output markets for a cash 
crop, a household will not reap benefits by producing the crop.  Without access to 
employment or the skills needed to get a job, a worker is forced to scratch out a 
livelihood at home, most commonly as a subsistence producer.  An important pathway 
out of poverty involves helping poor rural households acquire access to these critical 
input and output markets. 
Markets can affect rural poverty in less direct ways, though.  One of these is 
through consumption linkages.  If some rural households obtain income by producing for 
markets, their demands for goods and services offered by other households will increase.  
This is illustrated in Figure 4.7.  A policy or market change that directly affects a non-
poor household (say, a commercial farmer) induces that household to adjust its 
production and consumption activities ((a) in the Figure).  In the process, it creates new 
linkages with the non-farm sector but also may increase its demand for goods and 
services supplied by other rural households (b).  Studies of village multipliers find that 
when one household’s income from outside the village increases by $1, total village 
income can increase by $2 or more because of these linkages.  If the households 
supplying the good or service are poor, poverty may decrease.  It is not difficult to find 
village brick layers, butchers, and even hair dressers whose businesses would dry up if 
other village households did not have access to the markets from which they get their 
income.  To put these more complex webs of markets to work, poor households need 
access to the markets linking them to the other households’ demands, as well as the 
capacity to meet those demands. 
 
(5) Gaining Access to Diversified Income Sources 
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Some rural households specialize in agricultural production, but in most of the 
developing world rural households get income from a diversity of production and labor 
activities.  Diversification offers clues about how effectively different markets work for 
the rural poor.  When a household has full access to all markets on favorable terms, it can 
specialize in the activities that it does best.  Early economic thinkers like Ricardo argued 
that diversification usually comes at a cost, and economic research confirms this, 
particularly for the poor.  The most common explanation for diversification is risk:  by 
spreading its investments across multiple activities whose returns are not highly 
correlated, a household can reduce its exposure to income shocks in any one activity.  In 
doing so, it loses the efficiency gains from specializing in the highest-return activity.  If 
the household had access to other forms of income insurance, it could protect itself from 
risk without forfeiting the benefits of specialization.  Index insurance linked to micro-
credit is an example of how new strategies for financial-market development are trying to 
enable agricultural households to produce more efficiently (Carter, et al., 2007). 
Market failures can lead households to diversify or block their entry into high-
return production activities.  High-return cash crop production typically comes with a list 
of requirements that are beyond the reach of many poor households, including access to 
input and output markets, land, and capital; the know-how to adopt new crops and 
associated technologies and enter into contracts with buyers at high prices; and the 
quality, quantity and timing requirements of new supply chains shaped by the demands of 
processors, supermarkets and agricultural exporters.  Lack of access to well-functioning 
consumer markets or the risk of having to pay high food prices at certain times of year 
create incentives for households to devote some or all of their land and other resources to 
food production or low-paying wage work, even if higher-return activities are available.  
A household’s production and income portfolios reflect these market constraints.  In 
some cases, households engage in cash crop production but divert some of their resources 
to lower-return staple production or wage work.  In many others, market failures prevent 
cash crops from entering the production mix.  Omamo found evidence that agricultural 
households close to markets specialize (the white area in Figure 4.8), but the more 
isolated the household is from markets, the greater its diversification into multiple crops 
(the black area). 
Absent or poorly functioning markets impose two constraints on producers.  First, 
they take away producers’ flexibility in changing their choices of what to produce and 
how.  Second, as prices and other factors in the economy change, producers are less 
responsive when shifting their variable inputs.  
The early stages of China’s agricultural reforms provide a striking illustration of 
why markets matter.  Under China’s Household Responsibility System in the 1970s, 
small farmers became residual claimants to the returns from their production, keeping the 
profits from what they produced while also bearing the risk of losses.  While still 
maintaining control over markets, China’s government increased the purchase prices of 
crops.  After 1984, China enacted far-reaching market reforms, further lifting restrictions 
on trade, commercializing the state-controlled grain-trading system, and investing in 
market infrastructure.  By the mid-1990s, most food commodities were marketed by 
farmers at market-determined prices.  The result was a sharp increase in the growth of 
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agricultural output and major declines in rural poverty.  Studies suggest that in some 
countries, including China and India, economic growth associated with agriculture is 
more effective at reducing poverty than growth outside of agriculture. 
Enabling poor rural households to get access to new income sources can help 
them directly, by increasing and smoothing their income and consumption, as well as 
indirectly, by providing them with the liquidity and security they need in order to invest.  
A first step in enabling poor households to achieve a more favorable income 
activity mix is to identify the impediments to the smooth functioning of product and 
factor markets, including markets for cash crops, labor, land and capital, which condition 
households’ on- and off-farm investments, and their access to complementary assets, 
particularly skills and know-how. 
 
(6) Overcoming Market Isolation 
Geography is often pointed to as a determinant of chronic poverty:  natural 
resource constraints, poor soils, lack of reliable rainfall, climate-dependent infectious 
diseases.  Geography and market access often go hand in hand.  Rugged terrain and poor 
roads often isolate chronically poor households from input and output markets.  Not only 
do they make it costly to market output and purchase inputs, they also limit the 
information rural households have to make good production decisions.  
Non-poor households can fall below the poverty line if weather shocks cut off 
their market access.  Poor roads that become impassible in storms may prevent a 
household from selling its produce or acquiring key inputs.  They also may deprive poor 
households of affordable consumption goods, driving up the local price of food and other 
items.  When this happens, even the best conceived market support programs may fail to 
achieve their poverty-alleviation objectives.  Some rural households have the assets to 
overcome and even prosper from geographic barriers:  a 4-wheel-drive vehicle can allow 
a rich family to stay connected with market centers even during inclement weather, and 
also to demand a high price for the goods it brings back from town to sell in the village. 
The World Bank reports that just over 60% of the rural population in developing 
countries live in favored areas where there is irrigation and little moisture stress and 
medium to good market access (fewer than 5 hours from a market town of 5,000 or 
more).  However, in Africa two-thirds of the rural population lives in less-favored areas, 
with poor market access.  Using agriculture to reduce poverty requires targeting poor 
households in more favored areas as well as combating extreme poverty in less favored 
ones. 
 
(7) Securing Access to Market Information 
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Roads carry not only people and goods, but also information about markets, 
technologies, etc.  Lacking a reliable, efficient and low-cost communications system, a 
farmer or trader must travel, sometimes over long distances, in order to obtain market 
information.  Advances in communications make it possible to decouple transportation 
from communications to a great extent.  Cell phones can enable farmers and 
intermediaries to obtain information about markets without leaving their villages (see 
Part III). 
By linking cell phones to market exchanges in regional commercial centers, even 
small farmers can overcome tremendous informational asymmetries that have limited 
their bargaining power in traditional supply chains.  Knowing at what price their crop is 
selling in town can provide farmers, and especially groups of farmers, with a base from 
which to negotiate with traders for higher prices at the farm gate. 
 
(8) Avoiding Poverty Traps 
New research is finding that there are critical thresholds of wealth that people 
have difficulty crossing from below (Barrett, 2005; Lybbert et al., 2004).  Once a 
household drops below a critical threshold, poverty is likely to persist for a long time.  
The fundamental distinction between transitory and chronic poverty arises from the 
existence of these threshold effects.  For example, if a family’s herd drops below some 
critical size, it will no longer be sustainable, whereas above the critical size it will 
continue to grow.  This is illustrated in Figure 4.9, which relates heard size in a given 
year (t, the horizontal axis) to herd size in the following year (t+1, vertical axis) in a 
pastoralist population of Ethiopia.  Herd sizes to the left of the shaded “recovery zone” 
are not sustainable; the size in the next period is smaller than that in the present period, 
eventually falling towards zero along the sold curve.  For herd sizes within the recovery 
zone, the opposite is true.  The challenge, then, is to keep poor households from falling 
below the recovery threshold, which in this region is estimated at 3 head of cattle.      
Access to markets can play a critical role in enabling rural households to avoid 
poverty traps.  For example, a poor household’s ability to obtain a high price for its 
animals on the market can make the difference between being able to invest in new 
breeding stock to stay above the critical threshold and not.  Access to input markets, for 
example, veterinary medicines, can make the difference between losing an animal and 
dropping below the critical threshold and not.   
More likely, the capacity to avoid a poverty trap depends on having access to 
multiple markets.  Without access to credit, a liquidity-constrained farmer may have to 
sell his livestock at a low price during a drought, fully expecting to have to buy new 
animals at a higher price to renovate the herd later on.  In effect, the farmer is forced to 
“borrow” through the product market. It is rarely the case that a single market constraint 
is solely responsible for a household falling below the poverty line and into a poverty 
trap.  Barrett (2005, p. 56) notes that:  “In places with good market access and favorable 
agroecological endowments...poverty traps are less acute, trapping fewer people.” 
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Low incomes, ‘thin’ markets (with small volumes traded and large seasonal variability in 
supply and demand), poor infrastructure, difficulties in enforcing contracts, and poorly 
regulated rent-seeking by politicians, bureaucrats, criminals and private-sector actors 
make it difficult to develop supply chains, locking the rural poor into a “low level 
equilibrium trap” by dampening incentives to invest along the supply chain (Dorward, et 
al., 2004).  The key to getting people and regions out of poverty traps is to create a 
minimum level of investments above critical minimum thresholds.  Even here, some 
researchers argue that the very poorest should not necessarily be the primary targets of 
programs to eliminate poverty traps.  A project that targets households just below the 
poverty-trap threshold is likely to be more effective than one that targets even poorer 
households that will not make it above the minimum threshold as a result of the project 
intervention.  As Barrett, et al. (2008) write, “In the presence of poverty traps, modestly 
regressive targeting based on critical asset thresholds may have better long-run poverty 
reduction effects than traditional needs-based targeting.” 
Avoiding poverty traps can involve improving poor households’ access to 
agricultural input and output markets.  Agricultural households that do not have access to 
input and output markets (due to high transaction costs, lack of information, small scale, 
inability to comply with quality standards, etc.) are more likely to be chronically poor.  
They are also more likely to fall below the poverty line and become transitorily poor 
when misfortune strikes.  This is particularly so when one takes a dynamic perspective.  
If a nonpoor household gets better access to agricultural input and output markets, it may 
be able to distance itself from the poverty line and create an asset base (savings, 
livestock, etc.) that can keep it from falling into poverty in the future, a sort of self-
supplied safety net.  The perishability and low value-to-bulk ratio of food crops makes 
access to markets particularly crucial to profitability.  Good market access can both keep 
agricultural households from falling below the poverty line and enable chronically poor 
agricultural households to climb out of poverty. 
 
(9) Making Sure Consumption Benefits Reach the Rural Poor 
Poor rural households spend a disproportionately large share of their income on 
food.  For example, in six countries studied by Karfakis, et al. (2008), the food budget 
share for the poorest quintile of rural households ranged from a low of just under 60% (in 
Guatemala) to more than 75% (in Nepal).  Even though poor rural households in these 
countries get 20 to 70 percent of their income from farm and related activities, higher 
agricultural prices were found to reduce welfare in poor rural households because of 
increased consumption costs.   
Greater integration with markets does not automatically lower consumption costs 
for rural households.  If there are intermediaries with market power, they will attempt to 
capture rents by buying cheaply and selling dearly.  When some agents hold market 
power, there is no guarantee that the benefits of lower consumption prices will be 
transmitted to the rural poor.   
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It is also possible that outside demand for the goods and services supplied by rural 
households will push up consumption prices in some rural areas.  This could happen, for 
example, if a new road or export opportunities connect an agriculturally rich but isolated 
village to outside markets.  Without these, food production would be “trapped” in the 
village and food prices would be low.  Such cases probably are rare, however, because 
historically the agriculturally rich areas have been among the first candidates for road 
projects, and many already sell in outside markets.  It is more likely that access to new 
markets will lower prices for consumers—a clear benefit for rural poverty alleviation. 
 
Securing Access to Multiple pathways out of poverty 
As the diversification of rural incomes suggests, there are multiple pathways out 
of poverty, and these pathways may be different for different rural households or even for 
the same rural household at different points in time.  They may include agricultural 
intensification (via the adoption of new crops and technologies) and commercialization, 
critically involving both agricultural input and output markets.  They also may include 
transitioning from agricultural to nonfarm activities, participating in rural nonfarm labor 
markets, or migration.  Many rural households use a combination of these strategies.  
Access to agricultural, nonagricultural, labor and migrant-labor markets shape 
households’ capacity to make the choices necessary to escape from, and stay out of, 
poverty.  The key is to have some pathway out of poverty, so that choices can be made 
that lead to the accumulation of enough productive assets to earn a surplus above what is 
needed to stay out of poverty.  When getting high returns on assets depends on wealth-
determined market access, a key to rural poverty alleviation is extending market access to 
the poor.  
 
III 
Successful Responses and Hard-Won Lessons 
The Market Development Challenge 
Views on whether and how markets can be made to serve the rural poor are 
bracketed by two extremes, those of market skeptics and market fundamentalists 
(Dorward, 2003).   
The skeptical view is that poor rural households face such an unlevel playing field 
that they cannot possibly be expected to succeed by competing in the marketplace.  We 
offer two responses to this view.  The first is practical:  market integration is a fact of life, 
and if poor rural households do not benefit from it they may well do the opposite.  The 
second is optimistic:  there are a growing number of cases in which poor rural households 
have successfully overcome challenges in making markets work for them, as well as 
successful projects to assist them in doing so.  Markets can indeed contribute to broad-
based poverty–reducing development. 
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The market fundamentalist view is that providing access to markets is a sufficient 
condition for such development.  This perspective is overly optimistic, because many 
stakeholders, particularly the rural poor, lack the complementary assets and 
empowerment that are required to successfully compete in markets.  Improving market 
access without addressing deprivation with regard to complementary assets is not likely 
to succeed in reducing poverty. 
Economic growth, facilitated by the expansion of market activity, is a necessary 
condition for nationwide poverty reduction, but it is not a sufficient condition.  Growth of 
agriculture and other rural sectors can have significant impacts on rural poverty, as can 
urban growth when linked to rural household welfare, through food and labor markets or 
migration.  Development efforts that focus on agriculture can have significant impacts on 
rural poverty, but only when poor households get an important fraction of their incomes 
from crop production, agricultural wage labor, or demands for goods or services 
stimulated by rising farm incomes.  Often, however, they do not.  In the future, rural 
poverty reduction will have to rely on more than broad-based growth.  Instead, it will 
depend on the success of targeted, pro-poor policy interventions (Huang, et al., 2008). 
Lessons can be learned from past failures of agricultural policies.  One lesson, 
highlighted by the 1984 World Development Report, is the high cost to the economy in 
general and agriculture in particular when governments interfere in input and output 
markets.  Today there is much less latitude in governments’ ability to directly interfere 
with the workings of agricultural input and especially output markets under the rules of 
the WTO.  It is wrong for governments to completely distance themselves from markets, 
however.  Governments have an imperative to ensure that markets work fairly and 
equitably, regardless of socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, or other characteristics 
of rural stakeholders.  There is still a long way to go on this count.  Asymmetric market 
power, including monopolistic and monopsonistic power of market agents, corruption, 
and discriminatory practices, create an uneven playing field, particularly for the rural 
poor.  The fundamental theorem of welfare economics breaks down when markets are 
imperfect, opening up a wide berth for policy and program interventions to improve both 
equity and efficiency. 
Access and capacity to take advantage of remunerative and equitable markets is a 
priority challenge for most poor rural people.  A major development policy challenge is 
enabling rural households to compete and make use of the new market and policy 
environment.  At a grassroots level, this means understanding the obstacles that lie 
between rural people and the marketplace.  Supply-side constraints, including access to 
technology, extension, inputs, and financial services, result in sharply decreasing returns 
in crop production, higher costs, and lower profits.  High transaction costs related to 
inadequate infrastructure, lack of storage facilities, and lack of access to cheap 
transportation, create a gap between market and farmgate prices, squeezing profits.  So do 
asymmetric power relations along the supply chain.  Lack of access to reliable 
information about output markets (buyers, quality requirements, prices), inputs (reliable 
input providers, input prices) and production (new technologies and agro-ecological 
constraints) further constrain production decisions by small farmers.  Information 
asymmetries and risk shut small farmers out of financial markets.  These problems result 
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in production decisions that diverge, often sharply, from what they would be with good 
access to markets.   
Each of these constraints represents a logical point of entry for development 
programs.  The first step in addressing rural poverty is to ascertain which of these 
constraints or combination of constraints is most binding at a grassroots level, from the 
perspective of the rural poor.  This, in turn, requires understanding the diversity of rural 
income strategies.  Some markets are more important than others to a particular rural 
household, multiple markets and complementary assets matter, and no single market-
development model is capable of representing all or even the majority of poor rural 
households.  No “one size fits all” policy can alleviate poverty in rural households with 
substantially different characteristics and access to markets. Designing poverty 
alleviation policies and programs requires understanding, first, the changing market 
context in which the rural poor find themselves, and second, the challenges confronting 
them within this context. 
Many projects have been implemented to address rural poverty, some by 
governments, others by NGOs.  Some have succeeded, many have failed.  Successful 
projects invariably are ones in which clusters of concrete challenges confronting poor 
rural households are understood and measures are designed to enable poor households to 
overcome them.  Although there are many commonalities, these challenges tend to be 
context specific. 
The changing rural context creates new challenges for rural households as well as 
for development practitioners.  To compete, rural households have to be able to adjust to 
a changing and unpredictable economic environment.  To be successful, development 
projects need to understand the livelihood strategies of the rural poor and the market 
obstacles they face in pursuing these strategies, which are different for different 
households in different contexts. 
Helping rural households access new market opportunities requires public 
investments in rural education and health, rural infrastructure, collective action to 
increase farmers’ competitiveness, agricultural R&D, improving land tenure so that asset-
poor households can acquire access to land, facilitating micro-credit development, and 
making input and output markets work more efficiently.   Better education and health 
boosts not only farm productivity but also the capacity to find more lucrative off-farm 
work (Schultz, 1975; Zhang, Huang, & Rozelle, 2002).  Improvements in rural 
infrastructure, such as roads and rail, create the possibility of bringing a larger share of 
the price eventually received at the end of the marketing chain to the farm gate.  They 
also make urban and nonfarm rural jobs more accessible.  Agricultural R&D, by raising 
agricultural productivity, can enable small farmers to compete in new as well as existing 
markets.  Improvements in the land tenure system can enable poor households to gain 
access to land in local land markets.  They also increase the incentive to invest in land 
and enhance the collateral of farm households. If accompanied by improvements in rural 
financial markets, investments by farmers back into agriculture could rise.  In some 
places, including in China, smallholder incomes could rise further if governments relaxed 
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informal taxes/levies on farmers and removed remaining distortions that depress the 
prices of agricultural commodities (Anderson, et al., 2004). 
Meeting these challenges often requires partnerships between rural stakeholders, 
governments, and development agencies.  Just as governments are withdrawing from 
agricultural markets, so are development agencies.  NGOs are realizing that their role is 
to facilitate the integration of small farmers into new, sustainable market chains and 
strengthen their position in existing markets, rather than playing a direct role in these 
markets.  Projects that subsidize small farmers or in which an NGO or government entity 
occupies a link in the market chain are unlikely to survive once the project ends.   
Experiences from the plethora of projects that have attempted to make markets 
work for small farmers yield insights that can and should shape future initiatives.  Some 
concrete examples of successful responses to the changing rural economic environment 
are presented below.  We first consider government policies and their effects on rural 
poverty.  Then we turn to the experiences of NGOs. 
 
Policy Options for Alleviating Poverty 
Market Integration: Lessons from CAFTA (Sub-challenges 4 and 9)  
Developing countries increasingly are becoming parties to regional and global 
trade integration initiatives.  In many cases, markets within countries are also becoming 
better integrated.  Market integration means that the prices shaping producers and 
consumers’ decisions are determined in outside markets.  A policy that restricts imports 
of cheap agricultural goods, with quotas or high tariffs, is similar to a poor road that 
limits access to cheap food in town, in the sense that both protect the food producer while 
hurting consumers. 
Market integration, whether international or domestic, offers tremendous 
advantages to rural households, including the poor, but it also poses dangers.  When rural 
households have access to well-functioning markets, food security does not imply self-
sufficiency.  (It does, however, require having the cash to purchase food in the market.) 
The effects of economic integration on rural poverty are complex in part because 
of poor rural households’ dual character as producers and consumers.  A household that 
both produces and consumes staples is invariably affected both positively and negatively 
by the same staple-price change.   
In 2006 the countries of Central America and the Dominican Republic embarked 
on a new market experiment:  a free-trade agreement with the United States.  The stakes 
are high from a rural welfare point of view.  Rural poverty ranges from 60% of all rural 
residents in the Dominican Republic to 86% in Honduras.  The main immediate effect of 
CAFTA will be to phase out tariffs on food imports, which ranged from 10% to 62% for 
grains and as high as 164% for chicken (legs and thighs).  CAFTA is also being 
implemented in a context of generally deteriorating agricultural trade balances.   
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What are the likely impacts on different rural household groups?  An Inter-
American Development Bank study concluded that there will be little effect on the 
incomes of many smallholder households, who do not sell grain or meat and thus will not 
lose from cheaper grain imports.  In general, the larger commercial households lose more 
when the market prices of grain and meat fall.   
With few exceptions, though, the welfare of rural households increases, because 
the benefits of lower food-consumption prices outweigh any loss in cash income that they 
might experience (Taylor, et al, 2006).4  This is particularly true for the poorest rural 
households, which spend most of their income on food.  
One key to ensuring that poor rural households, particularly the landless, benefit 
from trade integration is making sure that the lower consumption prices reach the rural 
poor.  The other is to make sure that poor rural households have access to new jobs in 
cash-crop and non-agricultural production.   
The most important things government policymakers can do to help markets work 
better for the poor fall into three broad areas.   
The first is to create an economic and political environment in which markets can 
flourish in rural areas, and in particular, not to intervene in ways that impede market 
development.  This includes not only wise macroeconomic policies, which would be 
conducive to growth in any sector, but also sectoral policies that do not discriminate 
against agriculture—for example, cheap food policies intended to keep urban 
consumption costs and wages low.  It also includes political stability, fighting corruption, 
and avoiding regulations that promote rent-seeking by public and private entities.  When 
public policies create opportunities for individuals to capture rents instead of contributing 
to rural development, they will.  Even well intended policies often have unintended 
consequences, and these generally do not favor the rural poor, who invariably are the 
weakest links in the chain.   
The second priority for public policy is to create a level playing field so that 
farmers have access to markets and the capacity to benefit from them.  Investing in public 
goods, from roads to communications networks and rural education, is paramount.  So is 
vigilant monitoring and regulation to ensure that markets do not discriminate against 
particular social groups:  the poor, ethnic minorities, women, etc.   
The third priority is to target poor households with programs that will enable them 
to have better access to markets and the capacity to use them.  The conditions of poverty, 
by their very nature, create an unlevel playing field.  Targeted interventions to help poor 
households overcome obstacles to benefiting from markets is a flash point at which 
coordinated interventions by governments, NGOs, and private actors come together.  It is 
unlikely that any of these three sets of actors can do it alone.  The imperative for targeted 
programs is greatest where the rural poor have to adjust to a rapidly changing market 
                                                 
4
  By an increase in welfare we mean that the compensating variation or transfer needed to leave the 
household no worse off after market integration is negative. 
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reality, as is the case with far-reaching market reforms.  Adjustment policies are crucial 
during a transitional period, at least.  
 
Creating a Stable Economic and Political Environment  
A central message of the 1984 World Development Report was that government 
policies created market distortions that discriminated against agriculture in developing 
countries.  Since that time, developing countries have made progress towards removing 
policy distortions that discriminated against agriculture, particularly small farmers, but 
much remains to be done.  According to World Bank (2008, p. 10), 
Recent reforms have improved price incentives for agricultural producers 
in developing countries, reducing but not eliminating historical policy 
biases against agriculture.  Between 1980–84 and 2000–04 net 
agricultural taxation declined on average from 28 percent to 10 percent in 
agriculture-based countries, from 15 percent to 4 percent in transforming 
countries, and from marginally negative protection to net protection of 9 
percent in urbanized countries. However, a low level of net taxation hides 
a combination of protection of importables and taxation of exportables 
(especially in the agriculture-based and transforming countries), which 
can both be high...Hence, considerable room remains for further 
efficiency gains through reforms in developing countries’ own trade 
policies. 
 
Creating a Level Playing Field (Sub-challenges 1, 6 and 7) 
Removing policy distortions can increase the efficiency of agricultural producers, 
but only if they have access to markets.  Because isolation is such a large correlate with 
poverty and is detrimental to income growth, many development projects have focused 
on road construction and rehabilitation to bring more people to markets.  Assessing the 
impact of roads on poverty is very difficult, because the placement of roads and road 
projects is not random.  Comparisons of places with and without roads can be deceptive.  
Countries and localities purposely build roads in particular locations, for example, where 
there is economic potential or, if road construction is funded locally, where the resources 
exist to pay for them.  In general, studies conclude that roads are a necessary condition 
for rural economic growth, but a good road is not sufficient to ensure that the benefits of 
this growth reach the poor. 
Estimates for Madagascar suggest that a 50 percent per kilometer reduction in 
travel time on feeder roads would increase rice production by 1 percent, and the same 
reduction in travel time on highways would raise rice production by 1.3 % (Jacoby and 
Minten, 2007).  In Kenya, inadequate public investment in roads discourages low-cost, 
high-volume transportation providers, resulting in “high farm gate input costs; low farm 
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gate output prices; low traded volumes; volatile markets; [and] low productivity” (Obare, 
et al., 2003). 
Four to six years after road rehabilitation in Vietnam, markets were more likely to 
develop and were held more frequently, and more households diversified into trade and 
service activities as a result of road improvements, according to a study by Mu and van 
de Walle (2007).  Road passenger transport services were more likely to respond where 
markets were already established and natural disasters were relatively infrequent. The 
same study found that the availability of goods in the market improved more when roads 
were built or improved in mountainous areas, where geographic constraints are greatest.  
A study of the impacts of road rehabilitation in Georgia found that in the 
aggregate, opportunities for off-farm and female wage employment were significantly 
increased in project villages that received the new and improved roads compared with 
comparison villages that did not.  The gains in off-farm employment from better roads 
were confined mainly to non-poor households; however, the gains from extra female 
wage employment tended to be for poor women.  This study found no impact of road 
quality on sales of agricultural products.    
In Nepal, where rural poverty fell in the last decade largely because of rising 
nonfarm incomes and remittances, better road access disproportionately benefited the 
rural poor (WDR, p. 120).  Access to all-weather roads in 15 villages in Ethiopia reduced 
the incidence of poverty by 6.7 percent (Dercon et al., 2006). 
In Vietnam, rural road improvements were found to increase the variety of goods 
─ primarily fruits, vegetables and meats ─ that households sold in the market, but on 
further investigation these effects were found only for households in the north of the 
country, and more so for better-off and educated households. Rural road rehabilitation in 
Vietnam resulted in the rural poor engaging in more casual wage labor.  Low education 
households increased their participation in trade and service activities. 
Creating a level playing field involves more than simply building roads.  It also 
includes investing in information creation and access, market infrastructure, and rural 
education—assets that are critical complements to markets.  When wealthy farmers have 
access to good market information but poor farmers do not, the results are likely to be 
detrimental to both production efficiency and equity.  Throughout the developing world, 
there is a huge need for public investments in both creating information and ensuring that 
small farmers and poor rural households have access to it.  The importance of access to 
information on agricultural markets is illustrated by the large budgets that developed 
countries devote to it.   
In Niger, the construction of cell phone towers was found to reduce differences in 
grain prices across markets as well as lowering the variation in grain prices across 
seasons.  The greatest impact of cell phones was on price differences between places 
connected by low-quality roads.  The primary mechanism by which cell phones affect 
prices appears to be a reduction in search costs, as grain traders operating in markets with 
cell phone coverage search over a greater number of markets and sell in more markets. 
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This positive information effect increased with distance and also over time, as traders 
adjusted to the new communications technology.  Cell phones appear to have improved 
both consumer and trader welfare, perhaps averting an even worse outcome during the 
2005 food crisis.  Construction of a cell phone tower increased per-capita consumption of 
grain by an estimated 4.5 kilograms per year (Aker, 2008).   
Improved communications cannot help small farmers unless there is useful 
information to convey.  Linking information exchanges to cell phone technology can be a 
promising means of creating a level playing field with respect to information.   
Multi Commodity Exchange5 of India has been in operation since November 
2003. In 2007 it operated from more than 800 centers, with more than 1,600 members 
and 12,000 trading terminals, as well as through many private networks and internet 
terminals, covering more than 30 agricultural commodities and many other commodities 
and financial instruments. It was the world’s fastest growing futures exchange in 2005 
and 2006, becoming the world’s 10th largest futures exchange in 2006, surpassing the 
value of transactions conducted at the New York Board of Trade. 6  
Through linking technology developments with spot exchanges, handling and 
transport of physical commodities and futures exchanges, many of the instruments used 
for financing and risk management are now available to farmers in the remotest parts of 
India. Stand alone trading stations in places where roads do not reach are linked via 
satellite connections to spot and futures markets. Mobile telephony connected sub-
brokers have enabled price information to reach farmers who otherwise would not have 
any means of obtaining it.  
These farmers are now able to base their production decisions on information 
generated in markets where the price discovery process is transparent; demand better 
quality seeds that allow them to produce products of a quality that they can deliver to the 
exchanges; and deposit their products in exchange for warehouse receipts that can be 
used as collateral to borrow money from financial institutions, without feeling the need to 
sell crops immediately after harvest. All of this potentially brings new capital into rural 
areas, creating new employment opportunities and helping improve farmers’ income. 
Lowering transactions costs and improving access to information will always 
achieve welfare gains in the aggregate, but the effect on agricultural production and local 
welfare is not always clear.  New market linkages and better information can enhance 
agricultural production and affect land use, crop intensity and other production decisions, 
but it also can stimulate off-farm diversification and encourage migration.  Aggregate 
output and income gains are likely, but there are almost certain to be losers, too, when 
relative prices shift against the interests of some people. 
                                                 
5
 L. Rutan, India: developing a new ecosystem for agricultural trade, risk management and trade, 
International Conference on Commodity Exchanges and their Role Market Development and Transparency, 
Istanbul, Turkey, May 2007.  
6
 In the 2006/07 season the average monthly turnover was US$ 42.27 billion.  
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Improved access to information and roads is likely to improve welfare only if 
there are not other market failures standing in the way.  Even then, it is conceivable that 
better information among traders will not benefit small farmers, unless the latter are 
poised to make use of the information to enhance their bargaining position in the market.  
It is possible, for example, that access to cell phones could enable traders to buy from 
farmers with the lowest prices, and consumers in high-production villages could lose if 
traders are able to identify new markets for grain, buying up local supplies and driving up 
prices.  In the case of Niger, however, both traders and consumers were found to benefit.  
Whether poverty falls as a result of better roads and information is ultimately an 
empirical question.  This ambiguity makes it clear that infrastructure development is a 
necessary component of rural development, but it is not in and of itself sufficient to 
reduce poverty.  Poor road conditions are likely to coincide with other bottlenecks to 
agricultural production and economic development, including poor agro-climactic 
endowments, low population density, limited transport services, low education levels, 
poor access to health services, lack of electricity, risk, credit, access to irrigation, and 
other market failures.  A recent study by Mu and van de Walle (2007) notes in regard to 
roads that there is an “ambiguity about impacts on market and local area 
development...when road benefits depend heavily on geographical, community, and 
household characteristics, project design may also need to consider complementary 
inputs and policies to achieve the full potential benefits from the road.” 
Technological changes can reshape markets and alter the playing field, to the 
benefit of some producers and the detriment of others.  In Brazil, before the introduction 
of long-life, or UHT, milk, trade took place in regional markets, where local producers 
and a few companies competed. After the introduction of UHT, milk could be produced 
in one region and shipped to distant markets.  Thus, all companies could compete in any 
local market.  This benefited large companies but disrupted local markets, as farmer 
coops were unable to compete with large UHT suppliers. The market structure shifted in 
favor of large dairy plants.  Many cooperatives, and some traditional milk basins, 
disappeared (de Souza Filho and de Oriani Paulillo, 2004).  Governments need to make 
special efforts to create a level playing field in dynamic technological and market 
environments.  
 
Income and Poverty Policies Targeting the Rural Poor (Sub-challenges 2, 5, 8) 
In addition to creating a fertile economic and political environment and investing 
in such public goods as roads, information, market infrastructure and education and 
health, policies need to target poor rural households if a goal is to provide these 
households with access to markets and the capacity to use them.  For example, a poor 
rural household may not be able to afford to send a child to school, a reflection of failure 
in educational markets, and access to a road may do little to stimulate production by a 
poor household whose assets have fallen below a critical threshold and into a poverty 
trap.  
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In the 1990s, Mexico instituted two novel income transfer programs.  One 
(PROCAMPO) was an unconditional transfer program aimed at assisting farmers of 
sensitive food crops during the adjustment to free trade.  The other 
(PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES) was a conditional program designed to assist poor 
households while building human capital.  Both included poor farmers, and it was hoped 
that one of their effects would be to enable poor households to overcome selected rural 
market failures.  Both offer valuable lessons for designing and implementing rural 
poverty alleviation policies. 
 
Lessons from PROCAMPO 
PROCAMPO was implemented in the winter 1994 agricultural season to 
compensate farmers for potential losses resulting from lower grain prices under the North 
American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  A series of additional objectives were 
added to the primary objective of compensation for trade liberalization, including 
improving competitiveness and helping small farmers shift from grains to higher valued 
crops that were expected to benefit from market expansion post-NAFTA.  Eligibility was 
based on cultivation of any of nine key crops (maize, beans, rice, wheat, sorghum, barley, 
soybeans, cotton and cardamom) in the three agricultural years prior to and including 
August 1993. Since the majority of land owners in Mexico are male, the eligibility roster 
is primarily made up of men who own land.  Farmers did not have to sell in order to 
qualify for the payment:  Even subsistence farmers received 1,160 pesos (about US$116) 
per hectare cultivated in qualifying crops prior to the policy’s implementation.  There was 
no conditionality in this program:  farmers did not have to continue producing any of the 
key crops, or any crop, in order to receive the PROCAMPO payment. 
The PROCAMPO policy was expensive (just under US$1.5 billion in 2005).  
Most of the benefits did not accrue to small farmers.  The 10% largest farmers 35% of the 
PROCAMPO transfers, while the smallest 50% (each with fewer than 2 hectares) 
received only 13% of the benefits.  PROCAMPO did not achieve the goal of stimulating 
a shift from grains to higher-value crops in response to new market opportunities.  In 12 
years, only 5.8% of PROCAMPO recipients reported changing crops.  A key lesson from 
PROCAMPO is that complementary programs are required to improve the production 
capacity and market access of poor agricultural households receiving transfers.  No such 
programs were included with PROCAMPO.  (See Davis and Winters, 2007 and Dyer, 
2007.) 
 
Lessons from PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES 
OPORTUNIDADES is the cornerstone of the Mexican government’s strategy to 
reduce poverty. Launched in 1997 under the name PROGRESA, the program provides 
income transfers to poor households conditional upon their children regularly using 
health clinics and attending school. The goals of this program are twofold:  (i) to directly 
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reduce poverty by giving poor women cash payments, and (ii) to increase poor 
households’ investment in the human capital, which is critical to reducing the inter-
generational transfer of poverty.  Where low levels of schooling and poor health limit 
households’ access to agricultural input and output markets as well as their productivity 
on the farm, this program could have a direct (albeit long-term) positive effect on 
agricultural production in poor rural households.  The cash transfer can also enable poor 
households to overcome liquidity constraints on the purchase of agricultural inputs, 
raising crop production in the short run.  Both can also increase access to non-agricultural 
markets and non-agricultural production.  There is evidence that in Mexico and 
elsewhere, higher schooling induces rural households to shift into non-farm activities, 
particularly non-farm wage work (Taylor and Yúnez-Naude, 2000). 
Studies show that OPORTUNIDADES achieved both goals of reducing poverty 
and stimulating investments in human capital.  It does not seem to have stimulated 
agricultural production, however; on the contrary, higher children’s education and the 
time required to comply with the program’s conditionality requirements appears to 
compete with agricultural production and strengthen poor households’ connections with 
non-farm labor markets (Winters and Davis, 2007). 
Both PROCAMPO and OPORTUNIDADES / PROGRESA are expensive, and 
they do not appear to have facilitated adjustments in small-scale agriculture.  
OPORTUNIDADES / PROGRESA, however, appears to have had a significant favorable 
effect on rural poverty, by targeting poor rural households and promoting human capital 
formation (schooling and health).   
Conditional cash transfer programs similar to the Mexican model have been 
implemented in a growing number of developing countries, including ones with much 
lower income than Mexico.  According to Nancy Birdsall, president of the Center for 
Global Development, “...These programs are as close as you can come to a magic bullet 
in development. They are creating an incentive for families to invest in their own 
children’s futures. Every decade or so, we see something that can really make a 
difference, and this is one of those things” (New York Times, January 3, 2004). 
A key lesson of transfer programs is that, unless there is conditionality tied 
directly to crop or livestock production and access to agricultural markets, small-scale 
agriculture will not necessarily benefit even if programs are successful at reducing rural 
poverty.  If under-investment is due to market failures, simply increasing a poor 
household’s income with a cash transfer will almost certainly have a negligible effect on 
investment.  Conditionality, on the other hand, creates a price as well as income effect; in 
the case of OPORTUNIDADES / PROGRESA, it effectively lowers the price of 
schooling and health, inducing poor households to invest in both.  It is not clear why one 
would want to make a cash transfer to poor households conditional upon investment in 
agricultural production—or in any other specific income activity, for that matter.  
Nevertheless, interventions to reduce the cost of accessing agricultural input and output 
markets clearly would be necessary complements to cash transfers if a policy goal is to 
stimulate small-scale agricultural production by poor households.  If failures in 
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agricultural input and output markets limit the potential for cash transfer programs to 
benefit agriculture, these failures need to be addressed. 
 
 
Pan-territorial pricing in agriculture (what not to do) (Sub-challenges 6 and 9) 
One way governments have attempted to level the playing field is through pan-
territorial pricing policies, that is, raising food prices in low-price zones and/or lowering 
prices in high-price zones.  Such policies can shelter producers from variations in crop 
prices over space or time, but they create winners and losers:  They benefit farmers 
(while hurting consumers) if they raise food prices at times or places where prices are 
low, and they hurt farmers (while benefiting consumers) where prices are high.  To raise 
prices for farmers in low-price areas without raising prices to consumers, government 
subsidies are required.  As a result, these programs tend to be expensive.  They also 
redirect investments among crops.  Production of a crop rises in places where the policy 
raises the market price and falls in places where the policy lowers the market price. 
Smale and Jayne (2003) note that pan-territorial pricing proved particularly 
expensive in Zambia and Zimbabwe, since it raised the share of grain from smallholders 
in remote (but often agronomically high-potential) areas where transport costs were high.  
In Zambia, when pan-territorial pricing of maize was abandoned, there was a shift in 
cultivation from maize to crops such as cassava, groundnuts, and sweet potato (in the 
more remote northern and northwestern areas of the country) and to cotton (in the more 
commercialized areas). Maize remained the main food crop in most parts of the country, 
but its role as a commercial cash crop fell sharply. 
Some poor households in remote areas are surplus food producers.  They benefit 
when a pan-territorial pricing policy raises food costs.  However, most farmers are net 
buyers of food.  Poor households that are net buyers become poorer when their 
consumption costs increase as a result of pan-territorial pricing policies.   
 
Input subsidy programs (Sub-challenge 3) 
Countries also have experimented with input-subsidy policies.  However, such 
policies are costly, create distortions on the input side, foster corruption, and benefit large 
farmers more than the poor, without addressing the fundamental reasons for high input 
prices.  As Kelly and Crawford (2007, p. ix) write with respect to fertilizer in sub-
Saharan Africa,  
High prices are due more to policy uncertainty and structural problems 
that keep transportation, handling, and port clearance costs unnecessarily 
high, than to excessive margins...The measures needed to make inputs 
more affordable to farmers include building institutions to promote 
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competition while improving supply chain efficiency, investing in 
transportation and market infrastructure, investing in research and 
extension, managing price and production risk, facilitating rural finance, 
and strengthening legal and regulatory institutions. Improvements in each 
of these areas will contribute to improved profitability of fertilizer use by 
reducing input costs, raising or stabilizing producer prices, and improving 
fertilizer use efficiency. 
 
The appropriate policy response to high input costs is to make markets work better, rather 
than award costly input subsidies. 
In many African countries the transition to liberalized input markets has seen 
fertilizer use fall as commercial distribution systems compete with subsidized 
government programs (e.g., see Crawford, et al., 2003).  Kenya is an exception.  Fertilizer 
use almost doubled from the 1980s to recent years, and much of the increase was on 
small farms. The key to Kenya’s success in this regard has been a tremendous increase in 
private investment in fertilizer importation and retailing. The average distance a farmer 
needs to travel to get fertilizer has fallen from more than 8 km in 1997 to just over 4 km 
in 2004. Wholesalers and dealers have cut the cost of domestic marketing from US$245 
to US$140 a ton.  
Ariga and Jayne (2006) argue that sustaining this momentum will require a pro-
active role for government: rehabilitating the rail system and port facilities, and 
supporting the integrity of market institutions and arrangements designed to promote 
input credit and output market access for small farmers. 
Crawford, et al. (2003), after reviewing the experience of a number of countries, 
conclude that market liberalization, when implemented properly, has enabled the private 
sector to serve agriculture more effectively, but progress has been concentrated in high 
agricultural potential areas.  Farmers have benefited from greater availability and lower 
prices of inputs.  However, access remains a problem for poor farmers with limited 
availability of cash to invest in crop production, and access to markets and financial 
services has not improved for farmers in remote areas.  In areas where inputs could be 
used profitably but traders lack the incentives to create markets, programs may be needed 
to create incentives to pull private-sector actors into the market.  Kelly et al. (2003) 
describe public-private partnerships that can be effective at achieving this.  NGOs and 
extension can provide poor farmers with ways to make more effective use of small 
quantities of inputs, as well. 
In many other cases private incentives to invest in markets are limited because of 
lack of public infrastructure (roads, communications); weak contract enforcement, laws 
and regulations; small and declining farm sizes; or productivity constrained by lack of 
research and development, extension, well functioning factor markets and human capital.  
In these cases, public investments clearly are a prerequisite for market development.    
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When thinking about public-sector policies to alleviate rural poverty via market 
development, it is important to keep in mind that resources are always scarce, every 
program has significant opportunity costs, and thus the key policy challenge is to use 
public resources as efficiently as possible to achieve desired rural poverty outcomes. 
 
Case Studies from NGOs and Private Enterprises 
Many initiatives sponsored by NGOs and private enterprises have focused on 
integrating small farmers into high-value market chains, often oriented towards export 
markets.  If one adds up the number of poor farmers who have benefited directly from 
these projects, it is small.  Most of the world’s poor farmers either consume their 
production at home or, if they produce a surplus, market it in traditional chains.  (The 
multiplier effects of these projects can be significant, however.)  There needs to be a new 
emphasis in development policies and projects on strengthening the position of poor 
farmers within traditional chains, as well as continuing efforts to bring them into high-
value chains.   
Nevertheless, it is useful to draw out the lessons from value-chain projects, for 
two reasons.  First, the impact of these projects can go far beyond the numbers of farmers 
involved in them, because of the growth linkages that higher farmer incomes create in 
rural economies.  Second, many of the obstacles that these projects confront are similar to 
those that must be confronted in order to enhance farmers’ position in existing chains, 
and in the case of those who do not have access to markets, to gain market access.   
Below we examine a selection of case studies illustrating ways in which NGOs 
and private enterprises have attempted to address the nine sub-challenges outlined in Part 
II.   
 
Empowering Small Farmers by Association (Challenges 1, 3 and 7) 
There is a high correlation between farm size and access to input and output 
markets.  It is much more efficient for traders, supermarkets or exporters to buy from a 
few large farmers than from many small ones.  It is considerably more expensive and 
risky for a bank to make loans to many small farmers rather than to a single large one.  
Large farms are able to reap all kinds of economies of scale, from lower transaction costs 
in input and output markets, to securing access to market information and certifying 
production practices (e.g., for green or organic certification). 
Organizing small farmers into producer associations or coops can level the 
playing field and empower farmers in markets.  It is also potentially far less costly for a 
development project to work with a single farmer association than with each of its 
members.   
Nevertheless, there are many challenges to creating sustainable associations.  In 
 42 
order to achieve sustainability, it must be in the interest of each member to keep the 
group together.  It may be that groups whose sole purpose is to organize farmers to carry 
out activities on a group basis (combining produce into larger lots, negotiating with 
buyers, placing single large orders for inputs) are the ones most likely to succeed and 
persist.  When the group handles money, as well, there is more leeway for corruption and 
self-interest of individual members to jeopardize the survival of the group (e.g., 
embezzlement of assets).  Nevertheless, if the group is successful, it may be difficult to 
expand without taking on more financial functions.   
Shepherd (2007, p. 47) cites the example of a farmers’ group in Uganda that was 
organized to supply a fast-food restaurant with potatoes for French fries with support 
from an NGO.  The farmers planted a new variety and adjusted their production practices 
to ensure the right size and moisture content required by the restaurant.  They had to 
work as a group, staggering their planting, in order to insure a steady supply year round.  
The restaurant paid by check, requiring the coop to open a bank account.  A visit by the 
restaurant manager to the village proved to be an important catalyst in the development of 
this new market chain for small potato farmers. 
The Malawi National Smallholder Farmers Association (NASFAM) supports the 
creation and operation of “farm clubs” to improve access to profitable farming 
opportunities. It was formed in 1997, and by 2004 it had more than 100,000 members in 
5,000 clubs, representing nearly 5% of farming households in Malawi. The local clubs 
with 10 to 20 members are organized into associations, and NASFAM subsidiaries 
provide commercial and development support services to associations, clubs and 
members. Its success turns on a number of key factors, including:  focusing on motivated 
farmers and good business opportunities; market and client research before launching 
new activities; concentrating on developing linkages with a range of service providers 
rather than trying to provide too many services itself; and a core focus on developing 
market linkages, technical support, capacity building (literacy and management training) 
and governance (with standard membership rules and structures and financial 
management and auditing services). The clubs, associations and NASFAM constitutions 
provide overall membership control but also considerable independence to professional 
managers and commercially experienced leaders (Chirwa, et al., 2005).  
A successful farmer association does not guarantee that poor farmers will benefit, 
however.  The strength of the group depends upon the resources that each member brings 
into it, including know-how as well as other assets.  This puts asset-poor farmers at an 
immediate disadvantage.   
In Guatemala, a coffee coop of small farmers succeeded in obtaining significantly 
higher prices than those enjoyed by non-members.  Nevertheless, there were barriers to 
membership in the coop for the poorest coffee farmers, for a number of reasons.  First, 
members had to transport their harvest to the coop, and the poorest farmers could not 
afford the delivery costs.  Local traders pick up the coffee beans at the farm.  Second, the 
coop turned over its coffee to the exporter in January but did not receive payment until 
mid-May.  Payment from local traders was immediate.  Third, the poorest farmers were 
less educated and often non-Spanish speaking, and both of these traits were found to 
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discourage coop membership (Morgan, 2008).  Because of these problems, poor farmers 
were significantly less likely to participate in the coop.  Instead, they sold their coffee to 
local traders at relatively low prices.  Enabling poor farmers to obtain the benefits of coop 
membership would require interventions on multiple fronts, including education (Spanish 
language and literacy campaigns), transportation access to the coop, and quicker payment 
and/or access to credit to alleviate liquidity constraints.  This is a classic case of failures 
in one market (capital) preventing poor farmers from benefiting in another (group coffee 
sales). 
    
Market Empowerment and Value Chains (Sub-challenges 1, 2, 3 and 7)  
Most farmers are part of low-value market chains.  If they sell, it is usually in a 
spot market or to a small number of intermediaries who buy at harvest time, when other 
farmers are bringing in their harvests and prices are low.  They lack information about 
prices at the other end of the supply chain.  Without access to transportation at 
competitive prices and good market information, they lack bargaining power and have no 
choice but to sell low.  In this scenario, there is little incentive for farmers to invest in 
more productive technologies or improve product quality.  There is also little incentive 
for intermediaries to enter into higher-priced contracts with farmers.  Most of the benefits 
accrue further down the supply chain, to the intermediaries or end buyers. 
Producer associations can enable small farmers to gain access to high-value 
supply chains.  They can negotiate deals with buyers, like exporters, supermarkets or 
hotels, providing them with something that they are willing to pay a premium for:  high 
product quality and reliable supplies.  They also can help their members gain access to 
needed inputs on more favorable terms, information about markets and production 
technologies, and credit.   
More often than not, though, bringing small farmers into high-value chains 
requires more than a producer association.  
Farmers cannot benefit from increasing the harvest or raising the quality of their 
products if there is not a private-sector actor ahead of them in the supply chain who is 
willing to pay a “good” price for their produce.  Situations abound in which a food 
processor buys mediocre quality produce from farmers in local “spot” markets or via 
intermediaries who buy cheaply when the produce is abundant.  In such a setting, 
farmgate prices tend to be low and variable, farm families’ livelihoods are precarious, 
and there is little incentive for farmers to invest in raising productivity and quality.  The 
processor, in turn, finds itself in a different part of the same low-value chain, unable to 
obtain high prices and secure contracts for its processed fruits or vegetables from the 
buyers at the other end of the chain.  In this low-value chain equilibrium there is no 
incentive for the end buyer to offer higher prices to the processor, or the processor to the 
farmer.   
There are many examples of development projects that have tried to increase 
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farmers’ share of the benefits in low-value chains.  An example is the creation of a 
farmers’ cooperative that sells directly to the processor, or perhaps tries to augment the 
farmers’ market by identifying new buyers.  Sometimes these projects are successful, at 
least temporarily, but rarely are they sustainable, because they do not address the basic 
problem, which is that the farmers remain part of low-value chains.  After the 
development experts depart, the farmers’ cooperative and its members remain the weak 
link in this chain.   
Why would the processor in this example be willing to enter into high-price 
contracts to buy these farmers’ produce?  In a low-value market equilibrium it would not.  
The higher contract price to farmers would squeeze the processor’s profits, which in turn 
are squeezed by low prices in the markets where it sells.  There is no incentive for the end 
buyer to pay the processor a higher price.  Why, then, would it ever be in the interest of a 
buyer to enter into a contract with a seller, guaranteeing a high price for her produce or 
processed food?  Indeed, if such contracts are attempted in a low-chain equilibrium 
market, it is unlikely that the sellers will be able to come up with a reliable supply of 
high-quality products to comply with the terms of the contract.  New investments and 
incentives are needed all along the supply chain. 
The answer lies in moving from a low-value-chain equilibrium to a high-value 
one.  If the processor can guarantee a dependable source of high-quality processed fruit, it 
is likely to find a buyer willing to offer a price premium.  This is exactly what the Wal-
Marts and exporters of the world are looking for, and it holds promise in traditional 
markets, as well.  The processor can use part of this price premium to reward farmers for 
providing a more reliable and higher-quality supply of produce.  This can raise the 
farmers’ incomes and create both the incentives and the cash to invest in higher 
productivity and quality on the farm.  The two most critical ingredients in high-value 
supply chains are product quality and dependability of supply.   
Even though the high-value chain buyers prefer to buy from fewer, large 
suppliers, there are numerous cases in which small farmers benefit by moving into high-
value chains.  The key to their success lies in each individual farmers’ ability to supply a 
reliable (albeit small) volume of high-quality product, as well as other chain actors’ 
ability to efficiently aggregate this product up to the scale demanded by the supermarket, 
exporter, or final processor.   
An innovative practice in Sri Lanka has brought many small farmers working on 
less than one hectare of land into a high-value spice chain.7  The cornerstone private-
sector actor in the chain is MA’S Tropical Food Company.  It has assisted small farmers 
in organizing themselves, trained extension agents to help small farmers, paid price 
premiums to farmers based on quality standards, centralized its procurement system to 
make it cheaper and easier for small farmers to sell their products, and streamlined its 
logistics and inspection.  All of these measures involve costs for the company, but the 
returns outweigh the costs. 
                                                 
7
 For this and other examples of innovative practices visit the Regoverning Markets website at 
www.regoverningmarkets.org. 
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With higher prices, better organization, and information and training, farmers are 
able to produce a more steady supply of higher-quality spice.  That is, the value at the 
farmer-end of the supply chain is higher.  With access to a more steady supply of quality 
spices, the company can fetch a price premium in its markets.  The result has been higher 
income, more trade, and more rapid product turnover for the company.  There are day-to-
day challenges in keeping the chain going.  However, incentives now exist up and down 
the chain to keep it together and invest in making it better.  It is a high-value chain 
equilibrium.  
The key to this and most other successful projects is the ability of one or two key 
private sector actors to organize small producers and turn a low-value chain into a higher-
value one.  This clearly requires the participation and organization of actors all along the 
chain, including the small farmers.  Creating a farmers’ organization is a necessary step, 
but it is not sufficient.  Coordinated efforts all along the chain are required.  This, in turn, 
requires a great deal of effort and originality on the part of farmers and other key players 
in the chain as well as by those providing assistance to them.  It is precisely because of 
this that most poor farmers continue to find themselves in a low-value chain equilibrium.  
 
Finding Investment “Hot Spots” (Sub-challenges 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7) 
When a key link in a potentially high-value supply chain is missing it has to be 
created.  Private capital can team up with targeted development assistance to do this.  The 
experience of Ghana’s Tongu Gold Farm, Ltd. (TGF) illustrates both the promise and 
challenges in building high-value chains for pro-poor agricultural development.8  It was 
the outgrowth of a development project aimed at bringing pineapple farmers into a value 
chain.  Creating this value chain required linking local producers with European markets.  
The market research and networking required to do this are similar to what any private 
business would have to do.  However, a key player in the chain was missing:  a slicing 
facility to process pineapples not of sufficiently high quality to export as fresh fruit.  A 
small slicery was built with private capital and provided immediate employment for 40 
people, mostly women.  The original plan was to make good contracts with local farmers 
to supply the slicery.  Once the facility was in operation it became clear that TGF could 
not rely on supplies from local farmers while ensuring a secure supply to its customers in 
Europe.  It then started its own pineapple farm with partial support from the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs.   
TGF did not abandon the idea of bringing local farmers into the supply chain, and 
the multiple stages involved in producing pineapples created an opportunity to do this.  It 
started an in-vitro laboratory producing more than three million plantlets—a venture 
clearly outside the scope of what a poor farmer or farmers’ association could do.  It then 
initiated its own shoot farm, to grow the plantlets out and harvest the shoots to be planted 
on the pineapple farm.  Its goal was eventually to outsource the shoot farming to local 
                                                 
8
 This and the following two projects are described in detail in KIT, Faida MaLi and IIRR’ (2006) excellent 
excellent book, Chain Empowerment:  Supporting African Farmers to Develop Markets.  Only a brief 
summary of the projects and their lessons with respect to markets is given here. 
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farmers.  Before this could be done, though, the prospective outgrowers had to pass 
through an extensive training program on the TGF shoot farm.  This provided them with 
not only the human capital (skills, know-how, basic literacy) they would need but also a 
secure source of income as part-time employees on the TGF farm.  Once they pass 
through the training program, TGF provides each outgrower with one acre of plowed land 
and sells them the shoots and other inputs they need on credit, guaranteeing a price that 
will cover all of the costs.  After deducting these costs, TGF pays 50% of the profits from 
the shoots to the farmer.  The other 50% is put into a savings account, which the 
outgrowers can access after three years to start their own farms or for other purposes.  
TGF guarantees to buy the outgrowers’ shoots if they decide to start their own farms. 
This project has many characteristics of a private business that are critical to its 
economic success:  securing high-value product markets and buyers, investing in critical 
links along the chain, outsourcing, and provision of credit to outgrowers.    However, it 
also includes activities that go far beyond what most businesses would imagine doing, 
including training outgrowers, providing outgrowers with a steady source of income as 
workers on the TGF farm, and establishing savings accounts.  In TGF’s long-term 
development plan, these measures enable stakeholders to overcome risk and liquidity 
obstacles to eventually entering the chain.  Along the way, TGF assumes roles 
traditionally played not only by private enterprises but also by governments, including 
investing in its own electricity generation and road improvements.     
The success of TGF lies in understanding the multiple sub-challenges confronting 
local farmers, including the constraints they face with respect to information about 
market opportunities, access to high-value markets, technology and know-how, inputs, 
credit, and risk.  It almost certainly would have failed if it had ignored any one of these 
context-specific elements—and without the energy of a committed entrepreneur and 
foreign aid at critical junctures along the way.  Its success also depended on the 
commitment of the farmers, themselves, to take concrete steps to improve their 
livelihoods. This project goes beyond most traditional development models, in many 
ways blurring the lines between a development project and private enterprise. 
 
Private-Sector Initiatives Integrating Training, Credit and Marketing (1, 2, 3, 7) 
There are many examples of small farmers being unable to exploit new market 
opportunities because they lack access to both know-how (human capital assets) and 
credit.  In South Africa, a supermarket has enhanced its market position by offering 
fresher produce than its competitors.  It does this by providing a market for local farmers’ 
produce and providing farmers with interest-free production loans upon presentation and 
approval of business plans.  Repayment of the loans is deducted from payments to 
farmers at the time their crops are delivered to the supermarket.  The supermarket staff 
also make frequent visits to farms and provide training in product quality standards.  This 
private-sector initiative targets complementary assets (skills), complementary markets 
(credit), and linking of local farmers to high-value markets, all three of which are 
required for the farmers’ and retailer’s success. (Cited in Shepherd, p. 48.) 
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Another private-sector initiative organized 100 female farmers in a poor region of 
Bali to supply fresh produce to the hotel, restaurant and supermarket sectors and also for 
export.  The Bali Fresh company rented land for the women and for a company farm to 
supply them with seedlings, provides extension and marketing support to ensure 
consistent quality and quantity, and with the help of outside aid, set up a revolving fund 
to purchase inputs and literacy and bookkeeping courses.  Female farmers in this program 
now earn more than twice the minimum wage.  This project is notable for having brought 
women in a poor zone and with little or no farming experience into a relatively high-
value supply chain.  (Cited in Shepherd, p. 46.) 
 
Making Projects Market Driven:  Jatropha Herbal Soap in Tanzania (Sub-
challenges 2, 7) 
A traditional “project approach” (KIT, et al., 2006) entails such measures as 
identifying a promising product, providing individuals with inputs and training, and 
identifying markets on which products might be sold.  Often this is not enough.  There 
are many examples of projects languishing or completely folding once the development 
experts walk away.  In most, the stakeholders are left on their own too soon and have 
little chance to establish themselves as part of sustainable, high-value supply chains.   
In Tanzania, more than a dozen groups of women became involved in the 
production of jatropha soap after a project provided them with seeds, seedlings and 
cuttings;  offered them technical assistance and extension on how to grow them, and 
training on processing the plant’s seeds to make oil and soap (KIT, et al., 2006).  
Although many families have benefited from this project, fewer participate in this 
production now than when the project ended in 2004, and those who do see jatropha as an 
income supplement rather than a livelihood.  Only a few continue selling soap, all in local 
markets.  Most have fallen back to their original position of selling seeds or oil to a single 
soap processing company.   
The key to making a project like this flourish is integrating the jatropha producers 
and the processing company into a high-value market chain.  A feasibility study is needed 
to identify possible upgrading strategies, with respect to the product, the process by 
which the product is created, and the functions of different actors in the value chain.  
Ensuring uniformity and quality almost certainly will require that soap processing be 
centralized.  However, stakeholders need to be included in the business planning.  A 
development consulting firm, Match Maker Associated, Ltd., issued a list of 
recommendations related to standardization, packaging and labeling, diversification of 
soap lines, quality control, activity locations, creating export markets, and the functions 
of both the processor and women’s groups required to make this happens.  The jatropha 
story highlights the role of markets in successful development projects.  To succeed, the 
value chain development will have to be led by the private sector; projects that rely on 
donor funding are not sustainable in the long run.  Nevertheless, the role of support 
organizations as facilitators along the way can be critical.   
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Inserting New Links into the Value Chain:  Cashews in Mozambique (Sub-
challenges 1, 2, 4, 7) 
Cashews are the largest nut crop in the world.  Farmers in Mozambique, the 
leading producer of cashews, traditionally have been part of a very short supply chain.  
Raw nuts are sold to traders who then export them for processing.  Farmers could get a 
much higher price by selling to local processors or by processing the nuts themselves.  
A major project, supported by SNV, is trying to insert new links into the value 
chain in Mozambique by helping people start small-scale village processing plants, while 
increasing both the quantity and quality of cashew nut production on small farms.  The 
plants sell to factories for further grading, packaging and export to Europe.  This project 
is having success at creating relatively high-paying processing jobs for local people, with 
monthly wages almost as high as the average annual per-capita income in the area.  It has 
enabled more than 1,000 farmers, mostly women, to plant improved cashew trees and has 
provided training in cashew production and processing.  As the reliable supply of high-
quality of cashews leaving the village processing plants improves, so do prices.   
The key to success begins with markets, in this case, supplying processed cashews 
to the exporting factories.  Securing and keeping this market, in turn, requires making 
sure that the village processors can provide a reliable supply of high-quality nuts.  The 
village processing link in the value chain was the critical—and most novel—entry point 
for the project.  However, successful processing requires having a reliable supply of high-
quality raw nuts from farmers.  Moving back the value chain, the project provided the 
farmers, mostly women, with the inputs and know-how they needed to accomplish this.  
By becoming actors in a high-value chain, the farmers have become more productive, 
have improved the quality of their orchards and nuts, have learned how to cooperate with 
either other and with the village processors, and as a result, enjoy far higher incomes than 
before. 
 
 
 
The positive impacts of this and other successful value-chain projects go beyond 
the families involved in growing and processing cashews.  Higher incomes for farmers 
and processing workers are spent locally, creating new demand and incomes for local 
businesses and workers in other activities.   
There are many other examples of how markets can be creatively exploited to 
enable poor households to enter value chains and improve their livelihoods.  Some 
involve only agricultural activities.  For example, the Dutch-owned company Cheetah 
Malawi Ltd. provides a package of services to farmers through “paprika clubs,” a type of 
producer association.  The services include seed and extension to ensure the quality and 
The most successful development projects do not simply try to 
increase small farmers’ share of benefits in an existing supply chain, 
but rather, find new and creative ways for farmers to create value in 
the market.   
 49 
quantity of paprika production, without which the export market would quickly be lost.  
Buying depots and collection points are placed nearby, and clubs or groups of clubs may 
deliver their crops jointly, minimizing transaction costs for farmers.  Cheeetah now 
provides farmers with a computer-generated “seller sheet” with information about the 
farmers’ quality, price, deductions, cash advances, and levies, along with training on how 
to use this information.  Because of this innovation, the paprika farmers now have a 
record of what they sell and are owed, can ask informed questions about their deliveries 
and payments, and are less likely to be (or feel) cheated by company staff.  The company 
also benefits, with a full tracking and tracing system.  
In Peru, an NGO (FOVIDA—Fomento a la Vida) identified a market niche for 
small potato farmers to supply Frito Lay.  The company had cut back on its small potato 
suppliers because of high monitoring costs, relying instead on large producers and storing 
potatoes during the off season.  Because storage is costly, there was an opportunity for 
the NGO to organize small farmers and use an intermediary to assume the supervision 
costs associated with coordination and quality control.  Frito Lay bought potatoes under 
two arrangements:  Directly from farmers with cultivated areas of 5 hectares or more, and 
from small farmers organized under the FOVIDA umbrella.  As of 2005, nearly 50% of 
Frito Lay’s potatoes in the region were being supplied via FOVIDA.  The contract with 
Frito Lay, signed 2-3 months prior to planting, guarantees a price substantially higher 
than in traditional markets.  It also stipulates strict quality standards involving dry-
material and sugar content.  FOVIDA performs tests and quality control to ensure that the 
farmers adhere to these standards.  The company advances seed to supplying farmers, but 
only to the most qualified.  Even with the NGO’s efforts, there are challenges bringing 
the most asset-poor farmers into the market (Escobal, 2005).  
Other examples include projects supporting conversion to organic production and 
targeting the fair-trade market and linking producers and producer associations with 
alternative markets for their products, for example, biofuels. In the Andes, a combination 
of relatively strong forms of organization along with external support have generally been 
critical in opening up small farmers’ access to knowledge, credit, irrigation, technical 
assistance and new markets.  In the case of contract farming, the intermediation of 
commercial actors has also been important (Bebbington, 1997). 
Many projects by their nature involve multiple input and output markets, 
including linked nonagricultural markets and vertical integration into high-value supply 
chains, as exemplified by the TGF pineapple and jatropha cases described above.   Their 
success requires understanding and managing linkages among production activities and 
markets.  Development practitioners cannot perform all of the functions required to make 
most of these projects work.  Frequently, it is necessary to partner with private-sector 
players, designing projects that are beneficial both to them and to the rural stakeholders. 
The most successful development projects do not simply try to increase the poor’s share 
of benefits in an existing supply chain, but rather, find new and creative ways to help the 
poor move into higher-value chains.   
For an NGO intent on assisting small farmers many lessons have been learned 
from past projects.  Successful initiatives requires a demand- or market-led approach, in 
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which a market for the farmers’ produce is clearly identified.  The cashew and potato 
examples above are good illustrations of market-led projects.  To accomplish this, NGO 
personnel with solid marketing skills are indispensable.  Potential markets are not 
necessarily for export; only a small share of agricultural production is exported, and 
urban high-value markets offer great potential in many countries.  Publicity campaigns to 
increase consumption of fresh fruits, vegetables and animal products can be effective in 
bolstering demand.  Niche marketing, whether for specialized varieties (e.g., blue native 
maize) or to supply markets in specific seasons when supplies are not available from 
other sources.  Group formation (e.g., creation of farmers’ associations) is generally 
considered to be an important ingredient to enabling small farmers to have access to new 
and better markets; however, it is not sufficient.  In almost no situation is it helpful for 
the assistance provider, whether NGO or government, to provide marketing or other 
services.  When they do, the market chain is likely to be unsustainable, with little 
likelihood of surviving once the external assistance ends.  The involvement of 
participating farmers in all aspects of contract negotiations and chain formation is crucial.     
The need for coordinated actions up and down the market chain has important 
implications for project evaluation.  An increasingly popular subject of economic 
research is the evaluation of the impacts of specific interventions, like giving poor 
households access to loans. However, if the productive use of credit requires also having 
access to complementary markets and assets, the success of these focused interventions is 
likely to be limited.  Both development projects and efforts to evaluate their impacts 
should take on a broader, market-chain perspective.  
 
Increasing Poor Farmers’ Benefits in Traditional Chains 
For most poor farmers, the greatest hope for overcoming poverty lies in accessing 
traditional market chains on better terms, either as agricultural producers or workers.  
While many projects have focused on moving small farmers into high-value chains, 
fewer have focused on poor farmers in traditional chains.  Many of the same measures 
identified above apply to efforts to strengthen poor farmers’ position within traditional 
markets, including public and private investments to provide access to cheaper inputs and 
higher output prices, information, education and extension to improve productivity, and 
coordination of efforts via the formation of producer associations. 
There is also considerable scope for expanding traditional markets for food that 
can be produced by small farmers.  In Ethiopia, the government fully liberalized the grain 
market in March 1990, lifting all restrictions on private inter-regional trade flows, 
removing official pricing and quotas, and eliminating the monopoly status of the 
marketing board. Nevertheless, only 28 percent of total cereals production reaches the 
market and only 18 percent passes through the marketing chain.  This suggests that there 
is considerable scope for expanding the volume of the grain market.  
The obstacles to expanding the grain market are particularly severe for the poor.  
A study of grain markets in Ethiopia by Gabre-Madhin (2001) found that private sector 
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trade was constrained by weak public market information, the lack of a transparent 
system of grades and standards for grain, the use of verbal, non-standardized contracts, 
and weak legal enforcement of contracts.  Confronted by these problems, private traders 
either exchange with partners they know well or engage brokers who act as agents on 
their behalf.  Poor farmers tend to be excluded from these arrangements.  Development 
efforts to raise incomes of poor farmers in traditional markets need to focus specifically 
on these constraints. 
Linkages are critical within traditional as well as modern market chains.  Garoua, 
a Northern Cameroon town with an estimated population of 230,000 inhabitants, has 
more than 1600 small and micro commercial agri-food enterprises, one for every 23 
urban households.  Their food processing and catering activities are decentralized and 
labor-intensive and are increasingly important income earners for the poor. They are also 
among the most important economic activities for women:  A survey found that women 
ran 82% of the activities in Garoua food micro-enterprises (Sautier, et al., 2006).  
Connecting poor farm households with traditional food processing activities, as suppliers 
or as workers, can be an important element in rural poverty programs. 
 
Upgrading Agricultural Labor Markets 
Where poor rural households do not become part of high-value supply chains 
directly, wage work, even in seasonal agricultural jobs, can complement other income 
sources and enable people to go on living in rural communities while working on nearby 
commercial farms.  Wage work on high-value export fruit farms has become a vital 
source of seasonal labor for households in rural Chile.  So has linked seasonal 
employment in packing sheds, particularly for women (Jarvis and Vera-Toscano, 2004). 
Agricultural wage work does not necessarily lead to sustainable livelihoods when 
wages are very low and health hazards high, for example, as a result of agrochemical use. 
There is clearly a role for both governments and development practitioners in pushing for 
greater workplace security and control of health hazards, organization, skills training, and 
other measures to enhance the contribution of farm employment to economic livelihoods 
in poor households.  In casual agricultural labor markets, workers expend energy and 
time drifting from farm to farm seeking jobs.  This can create serious inefficiencies in 
agricultural labor markets and result in a high ratio of workers to jobs and low 
farmworker earnings.  This problem is not limited to poor countries.  In the United States, 
more than half of all farmworker families live below the poverty line with unstable work. 
Better labor management can improve opportunities for poor households to 
improve their livelihoods through agricultural wage work.  Rather than hiring large 
numbers of short-term workers, farmers could enter into contracts with crews of workers 
who move from farm to farm.  The agricultural labor market chain could be upgraded in a 
manner similar to agricultural product chains.  Farmers may be willing to pay a premium 
for crews of experienced workers and the peace of mind that their crops will be picked at 
the right time and in the right way.   
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Non-Agricultural Solutions to Rural Poverty 
As we saw in the Background Paper for Chapter 1, rural economies in the world 
are becoming less and less agricultural.  As one recent study notes, “The traditional 
vision of rural economies as purely agricultural is clearly obsolete” (Reardon, Berdegué, 
Barrett and Stamoulis, 2007).  
In an economy where poor rural households get a small share of their income 
from agricultural production or by supplying wage labor to farms, agriculture may be a 
way out of poverty for some, but helping households improve their earnings from 
nonagricultural product and labor markets needs to be part of the rural poverty agenda.   
Some rural households may be able to exit poverty via self-employed 
nonagricultural production.  A number of studies have uncovered high barriers of entry 
into nonfarm production activities, especially for poor households, despite high returns to 
such investments (de Mel, et al., 2007).  The rural poor have a hard time overcoming 
entry barriers into nonfarm activities.  Because of this, a recent study concluded, “The 
nonfarm employment and microenterprise programs now en vogue will not necessarily 
resolve rural income inequality problems and attendant social tensions nor automatically 
benefit the poor.”  The main determinants of unequal access to nonfarm activities are the 
distribution of capacity to make investments in nonfarm assets and the relative scarcity of 
low capital-entry barrier activities.  Therefore, it is crucial for public investments and 
policy to favor an increase in the poor’s access to assets that allow them to overcome 
nonfarm employment entry barriers.  One can not address rural nonfarm poverty without 
also addressing farm-side problems, and vice versa, because many nonfarm activities are 
linked to crop production, either directly (food processing) or indirectly (supplying 
nonfarm goods and services to farm households, e.g., construction; see Reardon, Taylor, 
et al., 2000). 
Far more often, the key nonfarm strategy to exit from poverty is via the labor 
market.  If rural families have good access to expanding nonfarm employment in nearby 
towns, they can continue living in their villages.  Their paychecks can also create income 
growth linkages that benefit other village households.  As a result, a dollar earned in town 
can contribute more than a dollar of new income to the rural community.  Poor 
households thus can benefit not only directly, by getting jobs in town, but also indirectly, 
from the increased village demand stimulated by nonfarm wages.  In developed countries, 
few rural communities live solely from agricultural production, and nonfarm work 
typically is an important source of rural livelihoods.   
There are three keys to enhancing poor rural households’ access to nonfarm jobs:  
creating a fertile environment for the growth of nonfarm jobs accessible to rural 
households; investing in the infrastructure needed to connect rural people to employment 
opportunities in town; and helping poor households get access to the assets required to 
take advantage of these opportunities, particularly education and skills. 
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Migration:  A Rural Poverty Solution? 
When it is not feasible to hold down a job in town while living in the countryside, 
rural households can be linked to expanding urban employment via migration.  People 
who migrate from rural areas to urban jobs frequently maintain close ties with their 
households and communities of origin.  Numerous studies document the importance of 
migrant labor markets and the income migrants send home, or remit, to rural households.  
If poor rural households are successful at placing family migrants in urban jobs, the 
remittances the migrants send home can be a powerful tool to combat rural poverty and 
provide income security.  In Mexico’s poor southern states, a 10% increase in remittances 
from internal migrants was found to reduce rural poverty by between one half and two 
thirds of a percentage point.  Here, as in the case of local wage work, access to schooling 
is critical.  The economic returns to education through remittances have been found to 
exceed 10% per year of schooling (Taylor, 1987). 
Overall, studies show conflicting findings about how international migrant 
remittances affect income inequality and poverty in migrant-sending areas.  Some find 
that inequality goes up and poverty decreases when remittances flow in, and others find 
the opposite, that remittances are income equalizers.9  There may be a simple explanation 
for this disagreement among researchers. 
International migration is costly and risky; thus, the “pioneer” migrants come 
from households that can afford the costs and risks of international migration.  These 
migrants send remittances primarily to households at the upper-middle of the income 
distribution.  This increases income inequality directly, and it has little effect on poverty.  
However, over time, as more and more households (including poorer ones) gain access to 
international migration networks, the effect of remittances becomes less unequalizing.  If 
the poorest households eventually gain access to international migrant networks, 
remittances can become income-equalizers and reduce poverty.  Taylor, et al. (2008) 
found that remittances from international migrants had little effect on poverty in regions 
where only a few households had migrants (because most of the “pioneer migrant” 
households are not poor).  However, in high-migration regions, increases in international 
remittances reduced poverty significantly.  It appears that even poor households gained 
access to foreign migration opportunities in regions where international migration has 
really taken off. 
Migrant remittances, like local wages, can create incomes for other rural 
households.  Through their market interactions, migrant households transmit the impacts 
of migration to others.  Non-migrant households can be affected by migration through 
their interactions with migrant households—or with households that interact with migrant 
households.  Because of this, a household does not necessarily have to have a migrant in 
order to be affected by migration.  In fact, it is possible that most of migration’s impacts 
                                                 
9
 For example, Barham and Boucher (1998), Oberai and Singh (1980), Knowles and 
Anker (1981), Adams (1989), and Adams and Alderman (1992) 
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on sending economies, especially on the rural poor, are found outside of the households 
that send the migrants and receive the remittances.  For example, if a migrant household 
uses remittances to finance a new project in the village, it may demand labor from 
another village household.  If the migrant-sending household had not participated in 
migration, it might not have invested in the project, and the other household might not 
have had a market for its labor. Investing may not be limited to the migrant household if 
there is a local credit market (formal or informal) to channel savings among households: 
a household that did not have a migrant could borrow from a household that did.  
Recent findings suggest that these indirect linkage effects of remittances are large 
relative to the direct contributions of remittances to migrant-sending household incomes.  
As a result, even if high-paying international migration is not an option for the poorest 
rural households, the effects of migrant remittances in rural economies may still be pro-
poor.  
For internal and especially international migrants, sending money home is not a 
simple matter.  Western Union, Moneygram, and other agencies have amassed a fortune 
by charging migrants high fees for wiring remittances.  It has been estimated that 
transaction costs constitute up to 15-20% of the total value of remittances in some cases.  
The alternative of sending cash, even with friends and relatives, can be prohibitively 
risky.  High transaction costs limit the amount of foreign earnings available for 
development at home.  
Facilitating relationships between banks at home and at migrant destinations is a 
critical first step towards reducing high transaction costs of remitting.  So is improving 
both rural households’ (and migrants’) access to banks.  Financial markets thus are 
important not only for agricultural production but also to enhance the contributions that 
migrants can make to rural incomes. 
Remittances also can be leveraged in ways that improve welfare and stimulate 
investments in migration source areas.  Leveraging remittances means seeking ways to 
multiply the amount of funds available to invest.  This can be done on two levels. 
First, individuals can obtain credit for small-scale production (and other) 
activities, using remittances as collateral.  Given well-documented imperfections in LDC 
credit markets, particularly in rural areas, micro-credit programs increasingly are a focus 
of policies to harness remittances for investments at home.  Some, modeled on the 
Grameen Bank, focus on women.10  If most migrants are men, there is an additional 
incentive to target micro-credit initiatives at women.  
                                                 
10
 In 1976, Muhammed Yunus founded the Grameen Bank to make loans to poor 
Bangladeshis. Since then the Grameen Bank has issued more than $3 billion in loans to 
approximately 2.4 million borrowers. To ensure repayment, the bank uses a system of 
"solidarity groups". These small informal groups apply together for loans and its 
members act as co-guarantors of repayment and support one another's efforts at economic 
self-advancement.  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Yunus. 
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Second, groups of individuals can organize and seek remittance matches for larger 
development projects.  Under Mexico’s tres por uno program, migrant home-town 
associations in the United States team up with villagers to propose community 
development projects.  For every dollar that the migrant association puts up, the federal, 
state, and (sometimes) municipal governments each supply an additional dollar.  This 
triples or quadruples the funding made available by remittances for civic projects.  It also 
promotes community-based development and creates an incentive for migrants abroad to 
contribute more income to their communities at home.  Such programs have supported a 
wide range of small infrastructure projects including water and sanitation, road pavement, 
rural electrification, micro-enterprises and small and medium enterprise development. 
The benefits of public-sector matching programs generally are limited to the communities 
that have a critical mass of emigrants who can form an association and generate a 
sufficient remittance base for projects.  One can imagine alternative strategies that might 
overcome these limitations.  For example, “migrant bonds” could be sold to migrants 
abroad, guaranteeing them a reasonable rate of return while making proceeds available 
for community-based development projects.  Groups of hometown associations may be 
able to pool resources for projects across more than one community. 
Migrant remittances have the biggest potential effect on economic development 
when they do more than simply hand income to migrant-sending households or 
communities.  The challenge is to create an environment in which income multipliers 
from remittances and other income can flourish.  Remittances and non-farm income 
create income multipliers within remittance-receiving households when they relax 
constraints on household purchases of inputs for production activities, adoption of new 
technologies, capital investments, or income risk.  For example, the money a migrant 
sends home might make it possible to buy both food for the family and fertilizer for a 
crop, which in turn creates more value when the crop is harvested and sold (or consumed 
by the family).  The remittances might make it possible for the family to grow the crop 
with a more productive technology such as a higher-yielding seed variety, or to buy 
inputs for a nonagricultural enterprise. 
As with any investment, the farmer has to be convinced that the investment will 
pay off and be worth the risk.  That means having (or being able to obtain) the know-how 
to efficiently perform the production activity.  It means having access to market chains 
and knowing how to make use of input and output markets effectively.  It means 
understanding that there will be a payoff to the child’s education in the future.  Nothing 
will wreck these incentives as quickly as a poor transportation, communication and 
marketing infrastructure; a lack of access to extension services or to schools; a belief that 
education cannot offer a way out of poverty; a macro-economic environment riddled with 
uncertainty; or, of course, a civil war.   
 
IV 
Conclusions:  Key Success Factors 
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The tremendous diversity of poor rural households makes it particularly difficult 
to design policies and programs to make agricultural markets more pro-poor.  No one-
size-fits-all approach is possible.  Nevertheless, a number of key lessons can be gleaned 
from the responses outlined in Part III. 
An overarching theme of this Rural Poverty Report is that the empowerment of 
poor rural men and women and the organizations which represent them is essential for 
reducing poverty.  Access by smallholder farmers to transparent and competitive markets 
is a fundamental part of any pro-poor growth strategy.  This includes access to 
agricultural markets, but as the nonagricultural component of rural economies grows, it 
also includes markets for nonagricultural goods and for both farm and nonfarm wage 
work.   
But giving poor households access to a market for their crop is not enough.  In 
order to use markets effectively, the poor also need access to complementary assets and 
markets.  Being able to sell a crop in the market might do little good if a poor farmer 
cannot afford to buy the needed inputs months prior to the harvest, does not have access 
to needed inputs, technologies, and know-how, or is too concerned about his family’s 
food security to take production risks.   
Both public-sector investments and development projects need to address these 
problems, helping the rural poor gain access to high-value chains in markets for goods as 
well as for labor.  Policies and regulatory frameworks should aim at building the 
autonomy, inclusiveness and technical and negotiating capacity of small farmers’ and 
rural producers’ organizations; at enabling the rural poor to overcome the challenges they 
face in securing a livelihood from their production activities; at gaining access to high-
paying and stable farm and nonfarm jobs; at exploiting potential synergies between farm 
and nonfarm activities; and in all these endeavors, at creating spaces for broad social 
dialogue and coalitions on policy and program formulation and implementation.  
 
The Changing Market Environment 
Globalization and market integration are a fact of life that will continue regardless 
of whether or not the rural poor are prepared for it.  The days of heavy government 
involvement in agricultural input and output markets are past.  The WTO and regional 
trade agreements increasingly handcuff governments’ ability to manipulate markets.  This 
is not necessarily a bad thing, because in the past governments frequently intervened in 
agricultural markets in ways that did not promote income growth or direct the benefits of 
this growth towards the rural poor.  Examples of policy failures abound.   
At the same time that the public sector has withdrawn from markets, agricultural 
supply chains have bifurcated into high-value chains, supplying supermarkets, high-value 
processing and exports, and traditional chains leading to low-value markets and food 
processing.   
Policies, investments and processes need to be put in place on multiple levels in 
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order to enable poor rural households to succeed in this evolving market and policy 
environment.  The key to doing this is having access to new market opportunities as well 
as the complementary assets needed to take advantage of them while at the same time 
confronting new challenges.  The laissez-faire approach of leaving the poor to find their 
own way in this new world does not offer solutions to rural poverty. 
The public sector has key roles to play as a legislator and regulator, to ensure that 
markets do not discriminate directly against the poor, women, ethnic minorities, or other 
groups; combating corruption; creating a stable political and macroeconomic 
environment in which economic activity and trade can flourish; and ensuring the 
provision of key public goods, including rural transportation, communications, marketing 
infrastructure, market information, and rural education.  These things set the stage for 
rural development.  Without them, private actors must expend inordinate effort trying to 
overcome the challenges created by policy and market failures, rather than building rural 
economic prosperity.  Those least able to do this are the rural poor.  A wealthy household 
can overcome the challenge of a poor road by purchasing a 4-wheel drive vehicle; of poor 
communications with a satellite phone; of poor rural education by sending its children to 
a private school in the city; the development drain of corruption by exerting political 
influence.  A poor household cannot.  The private sector can play a positive role in 
bringing about institutional change via pressure on public-sector actors and public-private 
partnerships.  For example, a private enterprise can enter into a joint venture with 
government to build a road to a new plant that will provide jobs and a market for local 
produce, generate power for the plant, and provide the plant with the communications 
infrastructure it needs to secure inputs and obtain market information. 
Even if governments provide these critical public ingredients to development, the 
conditions of poverty, by their very nature, create an unlevel playing field.  Specific 
policies and programs need to be designed by governments and the private sector to 
maximize benefits to smallholders from such innovations as vertical integration of 
domestic or international supply chains for food and the expansion of rural nonfarm 
opportunities.  This can include public-sector measures like requirements to include 
smallholders in vertical supply chains.  The “right” policy or project is context-specific, 
but the goal should be to enable poor rural households to become part of higher-value 
market chains, whether for agricultural products, nonagricultural goods and services, or 
work. 
Helping the poor become part of value chains usually cannot be accomplished by 
focusing on only one link in the chain.  Instead, it requires addressing challenges up and 
down the chain.  A small fruit farmer cannot increase the value she creates and takes 
home from the market unless the trader or processor who buys from her is also part of a 
higher-value chain.  The projects that have been most successful at raising small farmer 
incomes have involved creating a new equilibrium of interests along the market chain, in 
which the farmer is a participant.  Bringing smallholders together in associations is a 
necessary step in accomplishing this, but it is not sufficient.  Successful efforts to bring 
small farmers into market-value chains offer promise, both for farmers and for others in 
the rural economy who benefit, via market demand linkages, when small farmer incomes 
rise.  Nevertheless, it is not clear how scalable value-chain projects are:  at present, 
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linkage projects involving the creation of new market chains reach a small number of the 
world’s farmers, and particularly challenging obstacles confront the poorest farmers.  
Most agricultural and livestock production goes to domestic markets and passes through 
traditional market chains.  This means that, for most of the world’s smallest and poorest 
farmers, the key to increasing agricultural incomes lies in enabling farmers to access 
existing market chains on more favorable terms.  This, in turn, requires increasing the 
value farmers contribute to traditional market chains. 
As rural economies become less agricultural, nonfarm income becomes 
increasingly important as an avenue to reduce rural poverty.  Policies and projects thus 
need to focus on not only agriculture but also on improving access to nonfarm incomes.  
New nonfarm jobs and good roads to get people to these jobs will not bring benefits to a 
poor rural household that lacks the skills to get the job.  Higher incomes in other rural 
households, whether from crop production, salaries, or migrant remittances, can create 
new markets for goods and services demanded by these households.  However, this will 
not benefit those who lack the capacity—know-how, capital, willingness to take risks—
needed to respond to the new demand.   
Addressing all of these challenges requires forging new partnerships between the 
rural poor, private sector actors in market chains, development agencies, and 
governments, in ways that are mutually supportive in achieving sustainable income 
growth and channeling the benefits of this growth to the poor.  It also requires that 
governments and NGOs understand which combinations of interventions work and which 
do not.  One of the highest priorities for development practitioners is to have access (both 
on the input and output side) to an information exchange or clearing house, in which they 
can learn from and share experiences in the field.   
As the economic and policy landscape changes, so do the ways in which 
development projects are conceptualized and implemented.  The development project that 
sets up a farmers’ cooperative and leaves it to fend for itself in a complex marketplace is 
a thing of the past.  The new rural reality requires a more comprehensive, market-oriented 
and context-specific approach in which rural stakeholders, private investors and donors 
actively participate.   
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Figure 4.1.  Markets Affecting Rural Livelihoods 
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Figure 4.2.  Infrastructure Access of the Rural Poor and Non-Poor 
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Figure 4.3.   FAO Indices of Monthly Prices for basic food commodity groups (1998-
2007; 2000=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Trade and Markets and Agricultural Development Economics 
Divisions of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations. 
 
Figure 4.4.  Oil Prices and the Biofuel Demand For Corn 
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Figure 4.5.  Corn Prices and Oil Prices 
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Figure 4.6.  Changes in World Price (US$ and local currencies) and Domestic 
Prices of Rice in Seven Asian Countries, 2003-2007  
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Figure 4.7.  Rural growth linkages 
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Figure 4.8.  Isolation and Diversification 
 
Source:  Omamo (1998), p. 158.   
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Figure 4.9.  Threshold Herd Sizes and Asset Poverty Trap in a Pastoralist 
Population of Ethiopia 
 
Source:  Lybbert, et al. (2004), p. 771. 
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